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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah general partnership,
GARY WORTHINGTON ana EDWIN N. KIMBALL,
general partners,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
JNO.

vs.

20b74

C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, an
Arizona corporation, C & A ENTERPRISES,
an Arizona partnership, FIRST INTERSTATE
BANK OF ARIZONA, N.A., STEWART TITLE
COMPANY OF SALT LAKE CITY,
Defendants/Respondents.

APPELLANTS BRIEF

STATEMENT OF CASE

This action arises out of the construction of a two million oollar builaing
in Ogaen, Utah to house a manufacturing process.

The Arizona developer, u oc A

Development and C & A Enterprises (hereinalter "C & A"), failed to pay the Utah
general contractor, Worthington & Kimball, the balance due on the construction contract
of approximately $400,000.00. Pursuant to an arbitration agreement in the construction
contract, the parties arbitrated tne claims of Worthington & Kimball ana the developer's
counterclaim ot over one million dollars. I h e panel of arbitrators awarded Worthington
& Kimball $377,132.00 plus interest.

Worthington & Kimball sought confirmation ot

the arbitration award and enforcement of its mechanic's lien on the suoject property.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Tne trial court confirmed the arbitration awara in tavor of Worthington &
Kimball with the sole modiiication of a reduction in the interest rate provided in tne
arbitration award. The trial court denied the foreclosure of Worthington & Kimball's
mechanic's lien on the basis that tne lien was not properly perfected due to a defective
verification.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Worthington & Kimball seeks relief in three particulars. First, Worthington
& Kimball seeks a determination by this court that its mechanic's lien substantially
complies with the veritication requirement.

Second, in the alternative, that the 1985

amendment to the mechanic's lien statute repealing the verification requirement be
applied to the instant case. Third, that the interest rate awarded oy tne arbitration
panel be reinstated.

STATEMENT Ob FACTS
In July of 1980 C & A Development Company and Worthington & Kimball
entered into a contract for the construction of a builoing to house the manulacturing
process tor Permaloy Corporation. (R. 1,R. 1119, Ex. P-2) C & A Development Company,
an Arizona corporation, subsequently assigned the contract to C & A Enterprises, an
Arizona partnership.

(R. 1120) Affiliates of C & A had recently acquired controlling

interest in Permaloy Corporation.

Payments were made by C & A to Worthington &

Kimball with little difficulty until tne conclusion of the project. Wortnington & ivimoall
submitted its last pay request in November of 1981 for the sum of $445,833.00.

(Ex.

R. 1127, P-214) C & A failed to pay the balance due on the contract ana asserted
various and sundry reasons why it did not have to make the final payment.

Near the

completion of the project First Interstate Bank of Arizona loaned C & A $2,300,000.00

secured by a Trust Deed on the subject property dated November 1, 1981 recorded
November 30, 1981. (R. 1120)
Worthington & Kimball had never before filed a mechanic's lien on this or
any other project.

A mechanic's lien, however, had been filed on this project by a

subcontractor of Worthington & Kimball.
law firm of Kay, Quinney and hebeker.

Said mechanic's lien was prepared by the
(Ex. P-2i7) Worthington & Kimball using said

mechanic's lien as a guide, prepared a mechanic's lien ot their own. Cbx. P-219) Lawin
Kimball, one of two general partners oi Worthington & Kimoall, took said mechanic's
lien together with documents from which he could establisn the iirst and last aate ol
pertormance of work and appeared before a notary public employed at Otto buener &c
Co. (R. Partial Transcripts ot lestimony of Edwin Kimball, pages 2 - 5 and 2 - £)
ivir. Kimball's testimony was uncontrovertea that:

(1) he appeared before tne notary

public with the documents that he had brought;

(2) the notary wanted to see ivir.

Kimball's driver's license to compare signatures; (3) the notary informed Mr. Kimball
that the notary seal was for the purpose of identifying Mr. Kimball and his oath; (4)
that Mr. Kimball had taken the oath and properly signed the lien; (5) tnat Mr. Kimball
was informed by the notary that affixing his seal to the lien stipulated tnat Mr. Kimball
had appeared before him, and under oatn, had signed the lien and indicated tnat ii was
true anu correct and that Mr. Kimoall had personal knowledge of its contents;

ana

(6) that Mr. Kimball told the notary that the contents of the lien were true.

(R.

Partial Transcripts of Testimony ot Edwin Kimball, pages 2 - 5 and 2 - 9 ) Mr. Aimball
then proceeded to file the mechanic's lien in the Weber County Recorder's otiice.
Wortiiington & Kimball continued to try to obtain payment of the oalance
due on the contract, but its efforts were in vain. Worthington & Kimball then initiatea
a demano lor arbitration on May 25, 1982, before the American Arbitration Association,
pursuant to the contractual provision.

Worthington 6c Kimball subsequently obtainea

counsel who filed a complaint for breach of contract and for foreclosure of the previously

filed mechanic's lien.

(R. 1) Simultaneously, counsel filed a motion to stay said

proceedings pending the determination of the contractual issues in the arbitration
proceedings. (R. 8)
The arbitration panel was chaired by the senior partner of the Salt Lake
City law firm of Fabian & Clendenin, Peter W. Billings. George h. L.yman, Esq., and
B. Lue Bettilyon, an experienced contractor, also served on the panel. (R. 44) C & A
asserted a counterclaim in excess ot a million dollars. The arbitration consisted of 17
days of hearing during which in excess of 20 witnesses were called, including several
expert witnesses.

The transcript oi the proceedings exceeded three thousand pages.

The panel also made a visit to tne construction site. Both parties to the arbitration
filed extensive post hearing and reply briefs.

On November 7, 1983 the arbitration

panel awarded Worthington & Kimball the sum of $377,131.00 together with interest at
the rate of fifteen percent (15%) per annum from December 1, 1981 until paid by C & A
(R. 44).
C & A refused to pay tne sum awarded,

wortnington & Kimball fileu a

motion in the pending action to confirm the arbitration award. (R. 41) Said arbitration
was confirmed by order of the trial court on January 23, 1984.

(R. 166) Worthington

6c Kimball then sought to toreclose its mechanics lien. The issues were tried to the
court during a tour day trial. The court found

(1) that Worthington oc Kimball in the

performance of its contract with C 6c A pertormed the first work on July 15, 1980 and
did tne last work on November 12, 1981 (R. 1122); (2) that all of the work performed
during said time period was necessary to complete the contract between Worthington
& Kimball and C & A together witn appropriate cnange orders (R. 1122); (3) that the
work performed during the months of August, September, Uctober and November of
1981 was required under the terms and provisions of the contract oetween the parties
and was made in pursuance of the natural and reasonable fulfillment of Worthington 6c
Kimball's obligation under its contract and was not made lor tne purpose ot extending

the time of filing a lien (R. 1126-27); (4) that the work was not aone a long time after
the principal work had been completed but was pertormed within the time frame for
the reasonable completion of the contract between the parties and was not delayed for
the purpose of extending time to file a notice of lien (R. 1127) and; (5) tnat tne items
of work were not trivial or minor but were made in good faith to complete tne contract
between the parties (R. 1127).
The court also tound that the amount due and owing to Worthington oc
Kimball by C & A was the sum of $377,132.00 of which $2,355.00 was personal property
for which a mechanic's lien would not apply leaving a balance due and owing subject
to the Utan mechanic's lien statute of $374,776.00. (R. 1130)
The court found that the mechanic's lien of Worthington & Kimball was not
properly verified and was therefore null and void. (R. 1130, 1132) The court also held
that it appeared that the 15% interest awarded by the panel of arbitrators was a penalty
and theretore reduced the prejudgment interest rate to ten percent (10%) per annum.
(R. 1130) During the pendency of the proceedings, Pemaloy Corporation vacated the
premises. First Interstate Bank of Arizona subsequently foreclosed on the property by
foreclosing its Trust Deed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The jurat of the mechanic's lien filed by Worthington & Kimball, tne unpaid
general contractor, substantially complies with the requirements of Utah Code Section
38-1-7 (1953). The fact that the jurat does not specifically mention the word "oath" is
not fatal since the jurat states that Edwin Kimball, a partner in Wortnington & Kimball,
read the contents of the lien ana that the contents were true of his own knowledge.
This is especially true since Edwin Kimball discussed the oath with the notary public
and his swearing to the truth of the contents of tne lien so as to comply with the
requirements for an oath set forth in Coleman v. Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 29 (Utah 1983).

In the alternative only, assuming that under the pre-1985 amendments to
Utah Code Section 38-1-7 this Court is of the opinion that a oefect exists wnich voias
the $374,000 lien of the general contractor, tne 1985 amendments deleting the verification
requirement should be applied to this case. It is appropriate to apply said amenaments
since the revision to the mechanic's lien law is remedial in nature.
Finally, the lower court ! s modiiication of the interest rate provided by the
arbitration award exceeded the lower court's authority and was without justifiable basis.
The arbitrators had evidence upon which tiiey could base the interest rate award and
had authority to make such an award.

The modification should oe reversed.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE UTAH MECHANIC'S LIEN LAW WAS ENACTED
TO PROTECT THOSE WHO PERFORM LABOR AND
FURNISH
MATERIALS
ON
CONSTRUCTION
PROJECTS.
The purpose of the Utah mechanic's lien statute is to protect those wno
have added directly to the value of real property by performing labor or furnisning
material for the improvement ot the property.

From early in the history of this State

this Court has held:
The aim and purpose of our mechanic's lien law
manifestly has been to protect, at all hazards, those
who perform the labor and furnish the materials which
enter into the construction of a building or other
improvement.
Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 P.241, 244 (1917).

More recently

this Court stated in Stanton Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2o 184, 341 P.2d 207,
209 (1959) that the purpose of the lien statutes

is to protect those who nave addea

directly to the value of property by performing labor or furnishing materials upon it.
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Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207 (1959).
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POINT IV
THE
MECHANICS
LIEN
RECORDED
BY
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL ON JANUARY 14, 1982
IS IN SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE
VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE
SECTION 38-1-7 (1953).
Assuming that the mechanic's lien filed by Worthington & Kimball is required
to be verified, no particular form for verification is required by the statute.

Further,

this Court recently reaffirmed, in the case of Graff v. Boise Cascade Corp., 660 P.2d
721 (Utah 1983), that "substantial compliance" is the standard by which to juage tne
jurat. The jurat on the Notice of Lien filed January 14, 1982 by Worthington <k Kimball
constitutes a sufficient verification.
Comparing the jurat in the subject Notice of Lien witn tne statutory
acknowledgement form clearly shows that the subject jurat was much more tnan an
acknowledgement.
The statutory form (Utah Code Ann. Section 57-2-7) of acknowledgement is
as follows:
State of Utah, County of
On the
day of
, 19
,
personally appeared before me
, the
signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged
to me that he executed the same.
The jurat used to verify the lien in question is in the following form:
STATE OF UTAH )
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On this 13th day of January, 1982, personally
appeared before me Edwin N. Kimball, who duly
acknowledged to me that he has executed this notice
and that he has read the contents thereot, and the
same is true of his own knowledge.
/ s / Arnold AUreo
Notary Public
Residing at: 6586 W. 3500 S.
My Commission Expires:
18 Sept. 1985
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that case the notice of lien contained only a simple statutory corporals riCMiowieufccihent.
n

The acknowledgement in this case did not contain even
a general verification of the subject matter of the
notice of claim. The only fact that was sworn to was
the identity and authority of the person signing the
claim. There is no suggestion that he personally
vouched for the accuracy of the facts underlying the
claim. (Emphasis added).
Id.
Since there was no statemei . » . . * .

i

lien and knevi at' his own knowledge that the contents were true tne lien was la tally
defective,

I In jiiiM m lh
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In Graff v. Boise Cascade Corp., 660 P.2a 721 (Utah 1983), the lien was
bjgiit1*.1

Ilh

"" MM i n i 1 1 1

"I

" '.[HM'il

(

'In name of thr person who had read tl ie contents

of the lien nor was there a signature lo idenlily I lie persoi I.

In order to adopt defendants contention, it must be
assumed that the name and tne signature of Berk
Buttars were intended to be affixed on the blank line
provided for verification of the notice of claim. We
are not free to make those assumptions. (Emphasis
added).
Ic^ at 722.
This Court concluded that the notice of claim of lien lacked substantial
compliance with the verification requirement and was therefore defective.
In the instant case, the lien was properly signed by Edwin Kimball. Further,
the jurat clearly identities Edwin Kimball as the individual who read the contents of
the lien ana stated that the contents were true of his own knowledge. Therefore, this
Court does not need to make either of the two assumptions that the Graff Court could
not make.
A case with similar facts is Fircrest Supply, Inc. v. Plummer, <*0 Wash. App.
384, 634 P.2d 891 (1981).

The registered agent signed the claim directly above the

jurat. His name was typed in the jurat identifying him as the claimant who heard the
foregoing claim and read and knew the contents tnereof to be true.
turther signature of the registered agent below the jurat.

There was no

The court held tiiat the

statutory verification requirements for a lien claim were substantially satisfied.
Another similar case is Stephenson v. Ketchikan Spruce Mills, Inc., 412 P.2d
496 (Alaska 1966). As in that case, the claimant signed the claim form but not again
below the jurat. The claimants name, however, was typed in the jurat as Having read
the contents and stating that the contents were true of his own knowledge. The notary
properly signed. The court held that there was "substantial compliance" with the statute.
An almost identical factual and more recent case is Anchorage Sana ana
Gravel Co. v. Woolridge, 619 P.2d 1014 (Alaska 1980) where the Alaska Supreme Court
reversed a lower courtTs invalidation of a lien. The claim of lien was signed by a Buff
V. Jacobsen and followed by a notary's jurat stating:

THIS CERTIFIES tl lat on this 11th day.of Oct< .
rilVH, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Pubh :;-.
and for Alaska, duly commissioned and sworn as sucn,
personally appeared Buff V. Jacobsen known to me to
be the corporate Secretary of the above entitled
corporation and (s)he acknowledged that (s)he signed
and sealed the foregoing instrument freely and
voluntarily on begalf of said corporation, being duly
authorized to act on behalf of said corporation by its
board of Directors, and (s)he acknowledged that the
facts recited in the above Claim of JLiei are known
to him/her and (s)he hereby V 6 T 1 J - * *• •; -wild ,tOi.fti
are true and correct.
alli\k&> ivi\ H A N D AND SEAL the day and year
ii: :i * eertilieatc *':;*'-t above written.
/s/
_
_
N</I \Kv PUBLIC In anil I in Ww>ka

L
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a corporate acknowledgement,

* at was simply a variant of

'wit* court aiai^».

The jurat in tl le case at bar clearly goes furtl ten
it contains a corporate acknowledgement plus the
• following statement by a notary:
"(s)l le acknowledged that the facts recited in the
above Claim of Lien are known to him/her and
(s)he hereby verifies that said facts are true and
correct."

Mr
The court also rejected the contention that the jurat must ex r ^-.\ ._
lini fii'iiiii.'iiil made on outh.

-i

The fourl held:

We conclude that wi tei i a lien claimant, in tl le presence
of a notary, affixes his signature to a written statement
incorporating the necessary elements of a claim of
lien, and the notary certifies this act, claimant has
substantially complied with the requirement of an
"oath."
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rements oi me Utah Code, it specifically identifies tnai :,cvui. ••_; t uai.

the one who signed the lien, appeared before the notary and stated that he nad read
the contents of the lien and that the same is true of his knowledge.
While the jurat does not specifically mention that Mr. Kimball took an oath,
such fact is not fatal.

As mentioned above, the case of Anchorage Sana and Gravel,

supra, held that when a lien claimant, in the presence of a notary, affixes nis signature
to a written statement incorporating the necessary elements of a claim of lien, and
the notary certifies this act, the claimant has substantially complied witn the
requirements of an "oath." It should be noted that the case of H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical
Contractors of Alaska, Inc., 563 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1977) was cited as authority.

The

H.A.M.S. case is cited by this Court in both the First Security Mortgage and Graff
cases in support of the importance of the verification.
The case of Coleman v. Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 29 Outah 1984), discusses
what constitutes the taking of an oath.

The majority opinion does not answer the

question of the dissenting opinion as to the applicability of tne holding to mecnanicfs
lien actions. If the holding is applicable to mechanic's lien actions, the uncontrovertea
testimony of Edwin Kimball indicates that the Coleman requirements have been met.
Citing McKnight v. State Land Board, 14 titan 2d 238, 381 P.^d 726 Ubb^;
tne Coleman Court set forth these essentials of an oath:
1. A solemn declaration.
2. Manifestation of an intent to be bound by the statement.
3. Signature of declarer.
4. Acknowledgment by an authorized person that oath was taken.
Coleman at 31.
The Coleman Court rejected the validity of a police officers report stating:

The foregoing precedents set by this Court require a
tunital verbal affirmation in order for a statement to
be validly sworn to. We thus conclude that since the
patrolman failed to verbally affirm or swear to the
validity of the contents of the report, the report was
not validly sworn to.
Coleman at 31
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toparently had no discussion whatsoever.

Mr. Kimball went even further than the applicant in McKnight since Mr. Kimball actually
discussed the oath with the notary and told him the contents of the lien were true.
There was no such evidence of any discussion of an oath between the applicant and
the notary in McKnight.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the mechanic's lien of Worthington 6c
Kimball substantially complies with the verification requirements of the statute, including
the requirement ot an oath.
POINT V

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 38-1-7, AS
AMENDED EFFECTIVE APRIL 29, 1985, APPLIES TO
THE CASE AT BAR
A.
SINCE THE MECHANIC'S LIEN LAW IS
PROCEDURAL
IN
NATURE,
UTAH
CODE
ANNOTATED SECTION 38-1-7, AS AMENDED, IS
APPLICABLE
TO
THE
LIEN
FILED
BY
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL.
Utah Code Ann. Section 38-1-7 was amended effective April 29, 1985 to,
among other things, delete the requirement of a verification when filing notice of a
mechanics lien. Appellants Notice of Lien complies with the revised statute in every
respect.
The amended statute is applicable to Appellants lien notice even though
the notice was filed and the trial judgment was entered eleven days before the revised
statute became effective.

This Court has applied amended statutes to causes ot action

that accrued before the revised statute became effective when the revision was purely
remedial or procedural in nature. See Petty v. Clark, 113 Utah 205, 192 P.2o 589 (1948),
and Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117 (1909).
This Court, in Petty, aistinguisneo remedial, or procedural, law
substantive

law as follows:

from

Substai itive law is defined as the positive law which creates,
defines and regulates the rights and duties of the parties and
which may give rise to a cause of action, as distinguished from
adjective (or procedural) law which pertains to and prescribes the
• practice and procedure ,
by whiHi the substantive law is
determined or made effective.
iJoU?y 11 ;>93-94.
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[I] t is evident that the i«*nb - .* < statement does not create
the lien, for the language of UA. iiatute is :,any party claiming
a lien shall file," etc. but simply holds it in force for the time
of one year . . . so as to give the claimant an opportunity to
enforce the same by process of law.
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This judicial interpretation of the nature of the mechanic's lien law must be

considered persuasive in the absence of later decisions.
Previous Utah mechanic's lien law has also been reviewed by the United
States Supreme Court.

In Bear Lake Irrigation Co. v. Garland, 164 U.S. 1 (1896), the

Court stated that "the right i[in the mechanic's lien statute] consisted of the right ot
sale of the property in order, if necessary, to obtain payment of the money due tne
contractor. The remedy consisted of the taking of certain proceedings by which this
sale was to be accomplished."

164 U.S. at 13. Garland reinforces the idea tnat the

rights of a contractor accrue as work is accomplished on the project; the later filing of
a mechanic's lien statement is simply a proceuural step, "the taking of certain
proceedings," to perfect the lien. Any statute must be regarded as merely procedural
which does no more than direct the form the notice of lien must be in in order to
properly attach and which in no way affects the substantive rights of the contractor
which came into being at the time the work was done.
The Utah Legislature intended the amendments to Section 38-1-7 to oe
procedural only.

At the third reading of House Bill 56 (which became the revised

Section 38-1-7) before the Utah Legislature,

Representative Holt, sponsor ol the bill,

stated that the purpose of the Bill was "basically to simplify the procedures so that
anyone can file a mechanic's lien and not need to have to obtain services of an attorney
or something like it. It is just to make it a little simpler or a little easier for people
that may be affected and want to file a lien." Transcript of third reading discussion
of H.B. 56, January 17, 1985 8:00 a.m. (Emphasis added).

(See Addendum) During

legislative discussions of the proposed amendment, Rep. Holt stated that "the purposes
of this [bill] is just to simplity and get away from technicalities I oon't think have
any part with our procedures and our idea of what mechanic's liens are for, and that's
all this bill [addresses]."

Business, LaDor Committee Minutes, January 17, 1985, 8:00

a.m., at 2 (Emphasis added). Rep. Holt further stated that ?Ht]his [completing the lien
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In S & R Builders & Suppliers, Inc. v. Marler, 610 S.W. 2d 690 (Mo. App.
1980) the Missouri Court of Appeals held that a change in their mechanic's lien law
allowing a lien to be filed on three acres of land rather than one acre could be
retroactively applied. The court reasoned the change was remedial in nature and that
the legislature expressed no contrary intention that the amendment should be prospective
in effect only. In Kopp's Rug Company, Inc. v. Talbot, 5 Kan. App. 2d 565, 620 P.2d
1167 (1980), the Kansas Court of Appeals retroactively applied an amendment allowing
proof of receipt of a copy of a mechanics lien as adequate notice of the lien to others.
In Denver Wood Products Company v. Frye, 202 Neb. 286, 275 N.W. 2d 67 (1979), the
Nebraska Court held that a change in the mechanic's lien law extending the filing time
from three months to four months applied to all proceedings even if the right accrued
before the amendment became effective. In each of these cases, the court retroactively
applied revised statutes even though the lien may have been invalid under the old
statute. The courts apparently reasoned that rights under the mechanic's lien statute
accrued at the time the work was done, and that changes in the filing or noticing
procedures did not affect those existing rights.
The Utah Supreme Court has also applied statutes retroactively in areas
other than mechanic's liens.

In Silver King Coalition Mines Company v. Industrial

Commission, 2 Utah 2d 1, 168 P. 2d 689 (1954), the Court retroactively applied a
statutory amenament extending time for employer liability in workmen's compensation
cases. The Court said that "a law is retrospective in its legal sense, which takes away
or impairs vested rights acquireu under existing laws or creates a new obligation,
imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or
considerations already passed (citations omitted)." The Court held that the statute in
question was procedural, reasoning the rights of the employee to claim compensation
had accrued previously as part of the employer-employee relationship, ana that tne
employer had already incurred an obligation to pay if the employee contracted a work-

related illness.

Therefore, no new duty was imposed on the employer and there was

no unacceptable retroactive application of the statute.
The situation in Silver King is analogous to that in the case of a mechanic's
lien.

The owner of a project has already incurred an obligation to pay the contractor

as the contractor completes his work. The owner of the project has been enriched to
the value of the contractor's work and should not be allowed to retain this enrichment
without compensating the contractor.

The obligation to pay the contractor arises at

tne time the work is done, not when the lien notice is filed.

B.
THE MECHANIC'S LIEN STATUTE IS AN
EXTRAORDINARY REMEDY. ANY AMENDMENT TO
THE STATUTE IS THEREFORE REMEDIAL AND MAY
BE APPLIED TO THE CASE AT BAR.
The Maryland Court in Aviles v. Eshelman Electric Corp., 281 Md. 529, 379
A.2d 1227 (1977) followed a different line of reasoning in deciding that changes to their
mechanic's lien law should be retroactively applied. The Court held that the mechanic's
lien is not a vested right but an extraordinary remedy only.

Under this theory oi

mecnanic's lien law, any change to a mechanic's lien statute would be remedial in
nature and therefore could be retroactively applied.

Previous Utah cases have stated

that the purpose of the Utah mechanics' lien law is to "provide protection to those
who enhance the value of a property by supplying labor or materials."

Interiors

Contracting Incorporated v. Navalco, 648 P.2D 1382, 1385 (Utah 1982). See also Calder
v. Davis, 652P.2d 992 (Utah 1982); Davis v. Barrett, 24 Utah 2d 162,567 P.2d 6031 (1970);
Stanton Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P2d 207 (1959); Rio Grande
Lumber Co.v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 P.241 (1917).

This line of cases indicates that

the Utah Supreme Court has consistently considered the mechanic's lien law to provide
a remedy against nonpaying owners.

If this court adopts the theory of Aviles, the

question of whether the verification of the lien notice was substantive or procedural
would become moot; the amendment to section 38-1-7 would automatically apply.

Utah

has consistently held that the lien statute provides a remedy; it would be both logical
and just to adopt the Aviles position and apply the amended section 38-1-7 to the case
at bar.

To do otherwise, would deny a remedy to the very party the statute was

intended to protect.

C. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 68-3-3 DOES
NOT BAR APPLICATION OF THE AMENDED SECTION
38-1-7.
The statutory bar to retroactive application of statutes, Utah Code Annotated Section
68-3-3, is not applicable if the revised statutory amendment is intended only to clarify
or amplify how the law is to be understood. Okland Construction Company v. Industrial
Commission, 520 P.2d 208 (Utah 1974)(retroactively applying an amended
extending the maximum disability period in workmenTs compensation cases).

statute
The 1985

amendments to Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-7 were similarly intended merely to
clarify and amplify how the mechanic's lien law should be applied.
Rep. Holt f s comments, supra, indicate the purpose of the revision to Section
38-1-7 was strictly to simplify and clarify the intent of the legislature by making a
mechanic's lien available to the public without requiring the services of an attorney.
Under Okland Construction, therefore, the revised Section 38-1-7 should be applied
retroactively to the case at bar.

D.

CONCLUSION

The amendment to Section 38-1-7 in no way affects or changes any of the
rights or obligations of either party under the contract.

C & A could not have relied

on the provisions of the previous statute in making its contract with Worthington &
Kimball.

The amended statute will not deprive any party of any rights that it had

prior to the amendment; nor will it impose a new obligation on any party that did not
previously exist in the contract with Appellant.

The only obligation C & A has is its

pre-existing obligation to pay Worthington & Kimball for the work done on its project.
The amendment to Section 38-1-7 neither increases nor decreases that obligation, but
merely changes the procedure by which Worthington & Kimball's right to foreclose is
perfected.

The amended version of Section 38-1-7 therefore must be applied to the

case at bar. Appellants notice of lien is therefore in compliance with the applicable
statutes and should be declared a valid lien against the property.

POINT VI
THE INTEREST AWARDED BY ThE PANEL OF
ARBITRATORS SHOULD BE REINSTATED.
The contract between C & A ana Worthington & Kimball provides in article
11.1.4 that payments due but unpaid shall bear interest at the rate the Owner is paying
on his construction loan or at the legal rate, whichever is higher. (R. 60) In support ot
its claim for interest, Wortnington & Kimball submitted a summary of its interest
calculations as an exhibit in the arbitration.

(A copy of said exhibit is included as

Exhibit "A" in the addendum hereto). The panel of arbitrators, in the arbitration award,
provided that interest would commence in December of 1981. (R. 48) Averaging tne
applicable rates of interest on the aforementioned exhibit commencing in December of
1981 (which period included times of high interest rates, which were costly to worthington
& Kimball from December of 1981 through May of 1983, the month the arbitration
hearings were begun) produced an average interest rate of 15.8%. (See Addendum)
The Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association, the rules by which the dispute was arbitrated, referred to in Article 16.1
of the contract (R. 65) between the parties, provide, in Rule 43, entitled Scope of Award:

The arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief which
is just and equitable and within the terms of the
agreement of the parties. (R. 82)
The arbitration award granted, among other things, the following:
7. The contractor is entitled to interest at the rate
of 15% per annum on the sum of $377,131.00 from
December 1, 1981 until paid by owner. We select that
rate in part as a measure of damages to Worthington
& Kimball for the unreasonable withholding of the
balance of the contract price.
(R. 48)
Pursuant to the arbitration rules, the arbitrators are entitled to grant any
remedy or relief which is just and equitable.

The panel of arbitrators, after hearing

extensive evidence in the matter, including a counterclaim for over one million dollars,
rejected the claims of C & A and awarded almost the entire contract balance to
Worthington & Kimball. The arbitration panel chose the interest rate of 15%, which is
not unreasonable and is supported by the average of the applicable interest rates set
forth in the request of Worntington & Kimball.
There is precedential authority for arbitrators to awara interest be^unu tne
statutory rate.

In the recent case of Morrison-Knudsen ana Co. v. Makahuena Corp.,

675 P.2d 760 (Hawaii 1983), the Supreme Court of Hawaii upheld the arbitrators award
of interest at prime plus 2% even though it was at odds with the Hawaii statute
governing post judgment interest. The court concluded that what was labelea as interest
was actually intended by the arbitrator as compensation tor damages.
The interest award of the arbitrators to Worthington oc Kimball was likewise
compensating for damages and not a penalty, as construed by the lower court.

_ r>r> _

CONCLUSION
The mechanic's lien filed by Worthington & Kimball substantially complies
with the requirements of the Utah Code Section 38-1-7 prior to the amendments of
1985 and fully complies with the requirements in said section after the 1985 amendments.
The very purpose of the mecnanic's lien statute is to provide a means of securing
payment to parties similarly situated to Worthington & Kimball. It would be extremely
inequitable to deny recovery to Wortnington & Kimball wno, filing its first lien ever,
copied a lien prepared by one of the premier law firms in Salt Lake, which would be
deemed to have a super-technical defect in not mentioning the word "oath" in the
jurat. If the jurat is deemed to be required, the jurat substantially complies with the
mechanic's lien statute. The jurat identifies Edwin Kimball and clearly states that he
personally vouched for the facts underlying the claim. Mr. Kimball undisputedly discussed
the oath with the notary.

That is a verification.

The judgment of tfte lower court

declaring Wortnington & Kimball's mechanic's lien null and void by reason of a detective
verification should be reversed.
Further, the lower court's modification of the arbitration award reducing
the rate of interest awarded by the arbitrators should be reversed.

The award was

supportea by evidence presented to the arbitrators. Such award is within their powers
in granting "any remedy or relief which is just and equitable."
Respectfully submitted this 2$

A.day ot October, 1985.

WALSTAD & BABCOCK

By:
Robert F. Babcock
Attorneys for Appellant
Worthington & Kimball
Construction Company
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1. Mechanics Lien filed by Worthington & Kimball
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3. Arbitration Award
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NT/HCE OF MEN

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Notice is hereby given that the undersigned Gary Jj .
Worthing ton and Edwin N. Kimball d/b/a Wot: thing ton & Kimball
i

Construction Company, of l.indon, Utah, hereby

claims and!

intends to !,hold and claim a lien upon that certain real property
owned arid reputed to be owned by C and A Enterprises an
Arizona Corporation, which property is located in Weber County
State of Utah, and is more particularly described as:
Lot 9 Plat "A" of the Weber County Industrial Park.

jj
The aforesaid lien is to secure payment of the sum of
i

Four Hundred Thirty Thousand Five Hundred Eighty Six Dolljirs
and fifteen cents (430,585.15) plus interest accruing and!

I
other direct and related expenses owing and or accruing to
Worthington and KimballConstruction Co. for labor and materia]s
and 5jub-contractors hired by them or paid through

then as a

General Contractor for buildings and improvements in', on and
about the said property.
The foresaid indebtedness accrued and the foresaid labor
it

I,
and materials were furnished to C & A Enterprises Inc, the
i

owner of the above described premises under a contract off
construct.ion (with accrued change orders, extra work and additions)
made and entered into between Worthington & Kimball Construction
C D . as General Contractor and C & A Development Co. on the
2nd day of July, 1980 by the terms of which Worthington fif
Kimball Construction Co. did agree to con:;I ruct certain
improvements on and about the said property and C & A Development
did agree to pay there Core.

(MI1
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work was pet formed on the ]Jth-day ot hoveml.^c 100],

The

i^asonable value of the work performed by Worthington & Y ambnll
construction Co. duting said period is the sum of Two Million
Six Hundred Eighty Five Thousand, Five Hundred and Fifty One
Dollars ($2,605r551.00)aqainst which the sum of Two Million,
Two Hundred Fifty Four Thousand, Nine Hundred and Sixty Four
Lollars end Eighty Five cents ($2,254,964.05) has been paid
by C & A Companies.

The said payments lea^e a net balance

due and owing to Worthington and Kimball Construction Co. of
Four Hundred Thirty Thousand, Five Hundred Eighty Six Dollars
and Fifteen Cents ($430,536.15), after deducting all just
credits and oft sots pluc, an additional amount is owing for
interest and other accruing expenses.

For the said amounts

and accruing amounts Wort'iirgton and Kimball Construction Co.
holds and claims a lien by virtue of the provisions of Utah
Code Annotated Section 30-1-1 et seq (1953 as amended).
Hated this

day of Jan. 1902.
Worthington and Kimball Const. Co,
by

STATL OF UTAH)
County of <£\\LIQ)LQJ_

198 2^_, Pers$
Persop^^S!^
On this
1*3?*
day of JonUQHI 1982^_,
ck noj^MfloXl
''6r*/\
appeared before me Edwin N. KmbalT, who duly
-1--"1-- a--'
-^
feV^^N^^^
me that ue has executed this notice and that he h j _
aniex is^ t r u e of.
i s oi/l
contents thereof, that the samexis^true
of. h
his
o^^yfowledge^^J^
./ARNOLD ALLRHD 1
ary Public
^ ^ X ^ / V /
Nota
res iding . i t s X I ^ ^ C ^ S ^ ^ f i X L L ^ . ^
Ky Commission expires

(2)

79 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah
(801) 532-1500
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NOTICE OF LIEN
TO WIIOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Notice is hereby given that Hans R. Kuhni d/b/a Kuhni
Concrete Company (hereinafter "Kuhni Concrete"), of Provo, Utah,
hereby claims and.intends to hold and claim a lien upon that
certain real property owned, and reputed to be owned by C and A
Development Inc., which property is located in Weber County, State
of Utah, and is more particularly described as:
Lot 9 Plat "A" of the Weber County Industrial Fark
The aforesaid lien is to secure payment of the sum of Ten
Thousand Eight Hundred and Ninety-Six ($10,096.00) owing to Kuhni
Concrete for labor furnished by Kuhni Concrete as a sub-contractor
in, on and about the said land.
The aforesaid indebtedness accrued and the aforesaid
labor was furnished to C and A Development Inc., the owner and
reputed owner of the above-described premises, under a contract of
construction (with accrued change orders, extra work and
additions), made and entered into between Worthington & Kimball
Construction, as original contractor, and Kuhni Concrete on the
2nd day of July, 1980, by the terms of which Kuhni Concrete agreed
to construct certain improvements on the said premises and
Worthington and Kimball Construction did agree to pay therefor.
The first work under said contract upon the described
preminen won porformed by Kuhni Concrete on tin* l^th day of duly,
1'JQO, nml tho 1 <ifit work prior to Worthington and Kimball
Count rurl Inn'n l»n«.w h and icpudlallnn of tin* routiart wan |»nr fuimcM) on tho ?li.t «tay of IVhi II.II y, 1 <MU . Tim rra'toii.tMe v.ihio of
thu wot k performed !»y Kiilml Conrrolo during nald period In t |ir» num

Hundred and Seventy-Six Dollars (?71,876.00) has been paid by
Worthington and Kimball Construction.

The said payments leave a

net balance due and owing to Kuhni Concrete of Ten Thousand Eight
Hundred Ninety-Six Dollars ($10,896.00) after deducting all just
credits and offsets.

For said amount Kuhni Concrete holds and

claims a lien by virtue of the provisions of Utah Code Annotated
Section 38-1-1 et seq. (1953 as amended).
DATED this 3/*r

day of March, 1981.
HANS R. KUHNI d/b/a/KUHNI
CONCRETE CO.

By:
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
On this j3/f day of March, 1981, personally appeared
before me Hans R. Kuhni, who duly acknowledged to me that he has
executed this notice and that he has read the contents hereof,
that the same is true of his own knowledge.

•
liy commissidn-. expires:

Notary P u b l i c /
Residing at: Salt Lake County, Utah

BEFORE THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
Utah general partnership,
Claimant,

AWARD

v.
C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
an Arizona corporation,
C & A ENTERPRISES, an
Arizona partnership, and
C & A COMPANIES, INC., an
Arizona corporation,

No. 77-110-0130-82

Respondents.

This matter came before Peter W. Billings, George E.
Lyman and B. Lue Bettilyon, sitting as a board of arbitrators,
to resolve disputes between the parties arising out of the performance and interpretation of a contract originally between C & A
Development Company, as owner, and Worthington & Kimball Construction
Company, a Utah general partnership and L. M. Hendriksen, dba
Western States Construction, a sole proprietorship, as contractor,
for the design and construction of a factory building to be occupied
by Permaloy Corporation.
Seventeen days of hearings were held on April 25 to 29,
May 16 to 20, June 20 to 24 and July 14 and 15, 19 83 and the
construction site was visited by the panel and representatives of
the parties on July 14, 1983.

In addition, the arbitrators met on

July 5, 1983 to'review the evidence and to prepare suggestions to
the parties as to the matters they believed should be covered by
the post-hearing briefs.

During the hearings both parties were

given full opportunity to call all witnesses they desired and 84
exhibits were introduced by Worthington & Kimball and 59 by the
respondents.

Both parties were given opportunity to file and did

file post-hearing and reply briefs.
Under date of August 30, 198 3 Worthington & Kimball
moved to reopen the hearing to determine the respective rights and
liabilities of C & A Development Company, C & A Enterprises and
C & A Companies, Inc. under any award made in these proceedings in
light of an assignment of the original contract by C & A Development
to C & A Enterprises in March, 1981.

Under date of September 29,

1983 the American Arbitration Association notified the parties that
the arbitrators had agreed to reopen the hearings.

Under date of

October 18, 19 8 3 the parties were advised the reopened hearing
would be held on October 24, 198 3, limited to evidence and argument
as to whether any award can or should be made for or against any
party other than the parties to the original contract, i.e., C & A
Development Company as owner and Worthington & Kimball Construction
Company as contractor, and as to the allocation of costs and fees.
Because of the inability of counsel for respondents to
appear, the hearing scheduled for October 24, 1983 was not held.
By means of a conference telephone call, the parties stipulated
that in March, 1981 the contract between Worthington & Kimball and
C & A Development Company was assigned by C & A Development to
C & A Enterprises, an Arizona partnership of which C & A Companies
is a general partner.

The parties further agreed that respondents

should have until and including October 28, 19 8 3 to respond in
writing to the merits of the contentions of Worthington & Kimball
set forth in their motion to reopen the hearing.

The arbitrators, therefore, vacated the hearing set for
October 24, 1983 and granted Worthington & Kimball until November 4,
1983 to respond to any arguments presented by respondents as to
the effect of the assignment on the rights and liabilities of
C & A Development Company, C & A Enterprises and C & A Companies
in the matter before the arbitrators.

The arbitrators further

directed that the memoranda to be filed by each party should also
state the position of such party as to the assessment of costs and
fees in this proceeding.
After receipt of said briefs the arbitrators met on
November 7, 19 8 3 and, based on the evidence heard, the exhibits
introduced, the briefs of counsel and the visit to and inspection
of the construction site, make the following Findings:
1.

On or about July 2, 1980 Worthington & Kimball and

C & A Development Company entered into a contract on AGC Form No.
6a "Design - Build Agreement between Owner and Contractor."

The

only significant amendment to that form made by the parties was in
paragraph 2.5.2, to which was added the following language:
Any and all test borings, soil sampling and pre-determined
construction surveys and investigations (other than site
survey) shall be done by contractor, if contractor fails
or neglects to obtain such borings, testings, etc.,
contractor shall assume all liability for any failures in
the building as a result of any deficiency that may
result therefrom.
2.

We construe that language to mean that the parties

intended that if (a) the contractor employed a competent person
to conduct such borings, testings, etc., (b) fully informed that
person of the general nature of the planned construction, (c) the
borings, testings, etc., were performed and the report thereof
was made in accordance with standards of the industry, (d) the

plans and specifications provided by the contractor under paragraph
2,1 complied with the findings and recommendations of the person
employed to make such borings, testings, etc., and (e) the contractor
followed such plans and specifications in the construction of the
building, the contractor is relieved of any liability for any
failures or defects in the building resulting from soil conditions,
differential settlement and the like.
3.

In March, 1981, with the consent of Worthington &

Kimball, the original contract between Worthington & Kimball and
C & A Development was assigned by C & A Development "to C & A
Enterprises, an Arizona partnership of which C & A Companies, Inc.
is a general partner.

In addition, the property on which the

building was constructed was deeded by C & A Development to C & A
Enterprises.

By reason thereof, references in this award to "owner"

shall be deemed to include both C & A Enterprises and C & A
Development, jointly and severally.

We believe any allocation of

payment of the award is to be determined by agreement between them,
without necessity of any ruling by the arbitrators.

The obligation

of C & A Companies, Inc. under the award is only as a general
partner of C & A Enterprises and is determined by the provisions
of Section 48-1-12, Utah Code Annotated.
4.

The unpaid balance of the contract price, as adjusted

by change orders as provided in Article 9 of the Contract, to which
Worthington & Kimball is entitled to be paid as provided in Article
11 of the contract, is $430,053.00, subject to such deductions
therefrom as the arbitrators find to be warranted under the terms
of the contract and the evidence received with respect to the claims
of the owner.

5.

The owner is entitled to a reduction of the said

unpaid balance in the sum of $52,922.00, allocated as follows:
a.

Repairs to asphalt in parking lots and drives,
$25,125.00;

b.

Punch list items - this includes correction of
cantilever area of roof over dock, $10,000.00;

c.

Repair of external walls due to separation and
spalling, $2,500.00; and

d.

Credit for payments by C & A to Worthington &
Kimball subcontractors, $15,297.00.

6.

All other claims of the owner have been carefully and

fully considered, but are denied on one or more of the following
grounds:
a.

Not the responsibility of the contractor;

b.

Not supported by the evidence;

c.

Not authorized by or barred by the terms of the
contract between the parties, including the plans
and specifications;

d.

Not quantified by reliable evidence;

e.

Not included within the scope of the work to be
performed by the contractor;

f.

Barred by acts or failure to act of the owner; and

g.

Abandonment of the claim during hearings or in
briefs.

7.

The contractor is entitled to interest at the rate of

15% per annum on the sum of $377,131.00 from December 1, 1981 until
paid by owner.

We select that rate in part as a measure of damages

to Worthington & Kimball for the unreasonable withholding of the
balance of the contract price•
8.

All other claims of the contractor have been fully

and carefully considered, but are denied on one or more of the
following grounds:
a.

Not the responsibility of the owner;

b.

Not supported by the evidence;

c.

Not authorized by the contract or barred by the
terms of the contract, including the plans and
specifications;

d.

Already covered in change orders executed by owner
and contractor;

e.

Not quantified by reliable evidence;

f.

Are otherwise contained in the award herein made;

g.

Barred by acts or failure to act of the contractor;
and

h.

Abandonment of claim during hearings or in briefs,

9.

Owner shall pay to contractor the sum of $377,131.00

plus interest as provided in paragraph 7 above upon the contractor
filing with the office of the American Arbitration Association in
Denver, Colorado lien waivers from the contractor and all its
subcontractors.

This requirement does not include Robert E. Lee

doing business as Ogden Industrial Plastic, who we find is not a
subcontractor of Worthington & Kimball.
10.

Administrative fees and arbitrators1 fees and

expenses as determined by the American Arbitration Association office
in Denver, Colorado shall be borne 75.0% by owner and 25.0% by

-6-

Worthington & Kimball.

All other expenses shall be allocated as

follows:
a.

The expenses of witnesses for either side shall
be paid by the party producing such witness
including witnesses produced in response to the
arbitrators' letter to counsel dated May 27, 19 83;

b.

Cost of the stenographic record, equally between
owner and Worthington & Kimball, unless they shall
have otherwise agreed prior to the receipt of this
award;*

c.

All other expenses of the arbitration, as described
generally in paragraph 50 of the Construction
Industry Arbitration rules, shall be born equally
by the parties; and

d.

The nature and amount of such expenses shall be
determined by the Denver office of the American
Arbitration Association.

DATED this ~7 tj-

day of November, 1983.

<Z)io,)Q
" ~ ^

~ \ , ^

Peter W. Billings,

A-t-A.

B. Lue Bettilyorr

^

THOMAS A. DUFFIN of
SPAFFORD, DIBB, DUFFIN & JENSEN
Attorneys for Defendant,
Otto Buehner & Company
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 531-8020
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IK AND FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
Utah general partnership
GARY WORTHINGTON and
EDWIN N. KIMBALL, general
partners,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)
)

C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
an Arizona corporation,
C & A ENTERPRISES, an Arizona
partnership, FIRST INTERSTATE
BANK OF ARIZONA, N.A.,
STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF
SALT LAKE CITY, C & A
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., an
Arizona corporation,
PERMALOY CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, OTTO BUEHNER &
COMPANY, HOLBROOK COMPANY,
INC., DONALD K. LYBBERT, dba
LYBBERT MASONRY COMPANY,
JOSEPH SMITH PLUMBING,
REDD ROOFING COMPANY and
JOHN DOES 1 through 24,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. 83387

-2The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial
before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, one of the judges of the
above entitled court, on December 3 , 4 , 5

and 6, 1984.

Robert F.

Babcock appearing for and on behalf of plaintiffs, Uorthington
and Kimball Construction Company, a Utah general partnership,
Gary Worthington and Edwin N. Kimball, general partners; Robert
F. Bentley and Vaughn Armstrong appearing for and on behalf of
C & A

Development

Company,

an

Arizona

corporation,

C & A

Enterprises, an Arizona general partnership, comprised of Frank
S. Campbell, F. Richard

Campbell, Gary

Dee Jones, Robert A.

Campbell and Robert F. Bentley, and C & A Companies, Inc., an
Arizona corporation; LaVar E. Stark appearing for and on behalf
of First

Interstate Bank of Arizona, N.A., and Stewart Title

Company of Salt Lake City; Thomas A. Duffin appearing for and on
behalf

of Otto Buehner

& Company

and Joseph

Smith Plumbing.

Whereupon the court heard the respective testimony of plaintiff
and defendants in support of their Complaint and Counterclaims
and Cross-claims for a period of four days and then having taken
the matter under advisement, and now being fully advised in the
premises, enters the following Findings of Fact:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This is an action by the plaintiff as the general

contractor on an industrial project in Weber County, State of

-4Salt

Lake

County,

State

of

Utah, hereinafter

designated

as

"Buehner Concrete".
6.

That

Joseph

Smith

Plumbing

is

an

individual

proprietorship with its principal offices in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, hereinafter designated as "Smith PlumbingM.
7.

Stewart Title Company of Salt Lake City is a title

company with its principal office at 261 East 300 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah, hereinafter designated as "Stewart Title".
8.

That First Interstate Bank of Arizona, N.A., is an

Arizona corporation, with its principal office at the Interstate
Bank

Plaza,

P.

0.

Box

20551,

Phoenix, Arizona,

hereinafter

designated as "First Interstate".
9.

Permaloy Corporation, is a Utah corporation now in

bankruptcy and was at all times herein a tenant or lessee of
C & A Enterprises, an Arizona partnership, hereinafter designated
as "Permaloy".
10.

All of the other parties have not answered or have

filed dismissals or are not material to this action.
11.

That on or about July 2, 1980, C & A Development

entered into a construction contract with Worthington & Kimball
for a manufacturing plant to be built on Lot 9 in the Weber
Industrial Park in Weber County, Utah, hereinafter designated as
the

"subject

property"

for

$1,977,813.00, attached

Exhibit 2 of the trial exhibits.

hereto as

-512.

That after entry

into the contract between the

above entitled parties, C & A Development, as owner, assigned the
construction contract to C & A Enterprises.
13.

That on the 5th day of August, 1980, Worthington &

Kimball entered into a subcontract with Buehner Concrete for the
furnishing of concrete members (floor double tees inverted tee
beams, column and rectangular beams) for the sum of $469,657.00.
14.

That

Buehner

Concrete

furnished

the

first

materials on the subject building and property on the 24th day of
September, 1980, and furnished the last materials on the project,
pursuant to its contract on the 19th day of February, 1981.
15.

That a Deed of Trust to secure an indebtedness on

the subject building and property was given by First Interstate
according to the following terms, conditions, amounts and time:
Dated:
Trustor:
Amount:
Trustee:
Beneficiary:
Recorded:

November 1, 1981
C & A Enterprises
$2,300,000.00
Stewart Title Company of Salt Lake City
First Interstate Bank of Arizona, N.A.
November 30, 1981, as Entry No. 848026
in Book 1393, at page 1305 of official
records

16.

A mechanic's lien was filed in Weber County by

Gary J. Worthington and Edwin N. Kimball, dba Worthington and
Kimball in the amount of $430,586.15, plus interest for labor and
materials recorded January 14, 1982, as Entry No. 850356 in Book
1396

at page

258 of official

records, first work

day being

-67/15/80 and last work day being 11/12/81, hereinafter designated
as Worthington & Kimball's first mechanic's lien.
17.

A mechanic's lien was filed by Buehner Concrete in

Weber County in the amount of $46,966.00, plus interest for labor
and material, recorded January 15, 1982, as Entry No. 850122 in
Book 1396 at page 387 of official records, hereinafter designated
as the Buehner mechanic's lien.
18.

A mechanic's lien was filed in Weber County by

Joseph Smith Plumbing in the amount of $6,172.50, plus interest
for labor and materials, recorded January 29, 1982, as Entry No.
851211

in Book

1397 at page

24 of records, and re-recorded

February 19, 1982, as Entry No. 852228 in Book 1397 at page 1753
of

official

records,

mechanic's lien.

hereinafter

designated

as

the

Smith

No Counterclaim or action was filed by Smith

Plumbing to foreclose their lien and the parties stipulated that
the lien is null and void as an encumberance against the property
as herein set forth.
19.

A notice of lien was filed by Gary J. Worthington

and Edwin N. Kimball, dba Worthington and Kimball Construction
Co. in the amount of $430,586.15, plus interest for labor and
materials, recorded February 8, 1982, as Entry No. 851656 in Book
1397 at page

768 of official

records, first work

day being

7/15/80 and last work day being 10/23/81, hereinafter designated
as the Worthington & Kimball second mechanic's lien.

-720.

That the contract between Worthington & Kimball,

C & A Development and C & A Enterprises, provided for arbitration
and that an arbitration hearing was held between the parties and
an award was made together with Findings of Fact on the 7th day
of November, 1983, with Peter Billings, Chairman and George E.
Lyman and B. Lue Bettilyon as arbitrators, which

arbitration

award was affirmed by the above entitled court on the 17th day of
January,

1984, and

is now part

of

the

record

in

the above

entitled matter, hereinafter designated as the Arbitration Award,
21.
its

That Worthington & Kimball in the performance of

contract with

C & A

Enterprises

defendants, C & A Development
performed

the

first

work

on

Company, and
the

subject

property and subject building on the 15th day of July, 1980, and
did the last work on November 12, 1981, and that all of the work
between July 15, 1980, and November 12, 1981, was necessary to
complete the original, or general contract that Worthington &
Kimball had with the C & A Enterprises, together with appropriate
change orders.
22.
gave

to

That on August

C & A

Enterprises

14, 1981, Worthington
a

Certificate

of

& Kimball
Substantial

Completion, which is defined as follows:
"The Date of Substantial Completion of the Work or
designated portion thereof is the Date certified
by the Architect when construction is sufficiently
complete,
in
accordance
with
the
Contract
Documents, so the Owner can occupy or utilize the
Work or designated portion thereof for the use for

-8which it is intended, as expressed in the Contract
Documents."
The court finds that the Certificate of Substantial Completion
and the definition as given therein, and its purpose was not
given by

the parties

as

their

intention

that Worthington

&

Kimball's general contract and change orders had been completed,
but that the project had reached the stage of completion that the
Owner could start to commence to occupy the building, to install
various machinery, tanks and other equipment which
needed

in order

to carry on its manufacturing

the Owner

process.

The

document was never accepted by C & A Enterprises, among other
things.
The

court

finds

that

after

August

14, 1981, that

Worthington & Kimball performed the following work to complete
its contract with C & A Enterprises as follows:
DATE

DESCRIPTION OF WORK PERFORMED

8/15/81

Completed the general painting contract.

8/17/81

Obtained materials for the boiler piping
and installed them in the heating system
for the manufacturing purposes of the
C & A Enterprises.
Worked on the boiler piping on the
building.

8/18/81
8/19/81

Obtained strap and other materials for
hanging the boiler^ piping and worked on
the project on this date.

8/20/81

Picked up boiler piping, worked on the
suspended ceiling to complete this work
and drilled holes for the installation
of the boiler piping.
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8/21/81

Worked on the boiler piping.

8/24/81

Worked again on the boiler piping and
did weather stripping on the building.
Picked up and installed three locks
pursuant to the hardware schedule.

8/25/81

Work on keying the doors and hinges and
installed the bumpers on various doors
and did additional work on the boiler
piping.

8/26/81

The landscape architect completed most
of his work.
Work
wqs done on
installing
fittings
in
the boiler
piping.

8/27/81

Bases for the boiler pump were installed
Louvers were installed for the furnaces.

8/28/81

Sump at the ramp was poured and work was
done on the electrical system. Work on
the dampers was done.
SEPTEMBER 1981

9/1/81

Work was done on weather stripping for
the building together with work to get
the heat to the camera room.

9/2/81

Electrical wiring was performed for the
make-up air units.

9/3/81

Continued wiring for the make-up units.
Castors were installed for the large
swing doors on the project.
Work was done on the emergency lighting.

9/4/81

Materials were obtained for painting the
floors.

9/8/81

Materials were picked up for the alarm
system.

9/9/81

Materials were picked up for the epoxy
paint for the floor finish.
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9/10/81

The
subcontractor
picked
up
alarm
equipment for the subcontractor's work
on the project.

9/11/81

Work on the boiler piping.

9/21/81

Picked up sealers
Pratt & Lambert.

9/22/81

Picked up acid to clean the panels in
the front entry way and work was
commenced on this particular project.

9/23/81

ABC Fire Protection Equipment completed
their contract on the fire sprinkling
system for the building.

9/30/81

Checked out the electrical wiring on
Permatex. Color coded the three-phase
electrical system on the project.

for

the floors at

Also greased and lubed the motors on the
electrical equipment in the building.
OCTOBER 1981
10/1/81

Picked up the vents and piping.

10/2/81

Washed the front entry way with acid.
Prepared it for paint.

10/5/81

Additional entry way cleaned. Patched
the stairs with a first coat of
materials.
Worked on completing and
keying the hardware.

10/6/81 thru
10/8/81

Checked out the electrical system,
finished the walls in the building.

10/27/81

On this date the general contractor's
subcontractor
for
testing,
Servco,
check tested and started 4 Applied Air
Heaters.
Made
adjustments,
set
controls, set input gas air.
Set
dampers and checked modulation and
settings and calculated.
Instructed
personnel on operation. Remounted air

-11switch
lines
on
two
large units.
Repaired Partlow modulation on small
unit.
The cost for this, which the
parties testify was absolutely essential
for the operation of the air units, was
$326.50.
10/26/81

Sealed the stairs with a second coat of
sealer.

10/27/81 thru
10/30/81

Did
the
final
electrical
testing,
checked out the miscellaneous punch
items. Installed pans around the door
locks so that when doors were open, the
hardware would not push holes in the
wall as they were opened.
NOVEMBER 1981

11/1/81

Instructed the owner in the operation of
the mechanical design equipment for
make-up air units over the tank lines.

11/10/81

Installed
the roof.

11/12/81

Built and completed the drainage ditch
around the building and sprayed the
trees with wax sealer.

23.

scuppers and down spouts on

The court finds that all of the items, many of

which are mentioned and some which are not, were done to complete
the building

in the months of August, September, October and

November, 1981, were required under the terms and provisions
of Worthington & Kimball's contract with C & A Enterprises, and
were made in the pursuance of the natural and reasonable fulfillment of Worthington & Kimball's obligation under its contract and
were not made for the purpose of extending the time of filing of
a lien and none of them were done a long time after the principal

-12work had been done on the contract, and all of the reasons that
were

given

pursuant

to

the

evidence

were

satisfactory

and

reasonable to the above entitled court within the time frame for
the reasonable completion of the contract between the parties and
the court finds that they were not delayed for the purpose of
extending time to file the notice of lien.

The court further

finds that the items were not trivial or minor, but were made in
good faith to remedy defects or made in good faith to complete
the contract between the general contractor and the owner,
24.
Answer,

The court further finds that C & A Enterprises1

Counterclaim

in

Arbitration

also

alleged

that

the

contract between the two parties was not completed on November
12, 1981, the last date that work was performed by the general
contractor, and further allege that a punch list which they had
furnished previous to this time had not been completed.
25.

The court finds that the application for final

payment was not made until November 15, 1981, further indicating
that

the

parties

did

not

regard

that

final

completion

had

occurred.
26.
all

of

the

contractor

The court finds that before final completion of
items

and

the

under

the

owner,

contract
that

the

between
general

the

general

contractor,

Worthington & Kimball was ordered off the project because of a
financial inspection that was going to take place on or about

-13November 10, 1981, which would indicate to a loaning institution
that there were still items to be completed on the contract; and
work was thereafter suspended at the request of and pursuant to
the instruction of the C & A Enterprises•
27.

The court, therefore, finds that Otto Buehner &

Company, as a subcontractor of the general contractor, filed its
Lien on January 15, 1982, within 64 days after C & A Enterprises
requested and directed Worthington & Kimball to leave and cease
work on the project and the mechanic's lien was timely filed.
28.

A copy of the lien was mailed to the owner, C & A

Enterprises, on January 18, 1982, and was acknowledged by the
C & A Enterprises in open court as having been received and the
court

finds that although Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §38-1-7

requires that the lien shall be delivered by certified mail, that
the purpose of the statute was to assure notice and that where
the

C & A

notice,

Enterprises

that

the

duly

admitted

certified

that

mail

they

had

requirement

was

received
of

no

significance and that regular mail satisfied the requirements.
29.
lien

was

enforceable

The court finds that the Otto Buehner & Company

properly
lien

verified
pursuant

and
to

the

is

a

good

provisions

and

valid

of

Utah

and
Code

Annotated, 1953, §38-1-7, as of the time the first work was
commenced on the premises as of July 15, 1980, and is prior in

-14time to the mortgage of First Interstate Bank of Arizona and is a
first and prior encumberance as to the interests of all of the
defendants in this action.
30.

That the reasonable amount of labor and materials

properly incorporated into the subject property, subject to the
Utah Mechanic's Lien Statute by Otto Buehner & Company was the
sum of $41,466.00 together with interest since December 1, 1981,
in the sum of $13,820.00, or a total of $55,286.00, together with
reasonable attorney's fees in the sum of $12,000.00 for enforcement of its lien.

The court holds that the legal rate for the

enforcement of Otto Buehner & Company's lien is 10%. That all of
the parties herein stipulated that the sum of $12,000.00 for
services rendered herein by Otto Buehner & Company's attorney was
reasonable.

That

the amounts

provided

in

this

paragraph

of

$55,286.00, together with $12,000.00 attorney f es, are included
in the amounts due and owing by C & A Development

and C & A

Enterprises to Worthington & Kimball Construction and are further
included in the arbitration award as herein set forth.
31.

That Otto

Buehner

& Company

and Worthington

&

Kimball stipulated in open court that 15% interest would be due
and owing on the Otto Buehner & Company contract.

The court,

therefore, finds that Otto Buehner & Company is entitled to a
separate judgment against Worthington & Kimball, not included
within the foreclosure decree for the sum of $3,749.94 as the

-15difference between the interest rate agreed between the parties
and the legal rate awarded by the court.
32.

That Joseph

Smith Plumbing

furnished

labor and

materials of the reasonable value as hereinafter set forth to the
project at the special instance and request of Worthington &
Kimball,

although

foreclose

it

filed

a

mechanicfs

the lien and it is entitled

lien,

it

did

not

to a judgment against

Worthington & Kimball for the sum of $6,172.50, together with
interest at the rate of 10% from December 1, 1981, in the sum of
$1,974.52 or a total of $8,147.02.
33.

That the amount due and owing to Worthington &

Kimball by C & A Enterprises, is the sum of $377,131.00, together
with interest at the rate of 10% per annum.

The court further

finds that of this amount, $2,355.00 was personal property and
was not properly
subject

to

the

lienable, leaving
Utah Mechanic's

a balance

Lien

Statute

due

and owing,

of $374,776.00,

together with interest at the rate of 10% per annum.

It appears

to the court that the 15% interest awarded in the Arbitration
Award is a penalty and, therefore, the court is only awarding
Worthington & Kimball 10% interest on the amounts as provided
herein.
34.
Worthington
second

The court finds that the first mechanic's lien of

& Kimball was not properly verified and that the

mechanic's

lien

was

superfluous

in

that

the

parties

-16thought that the first mechanic's lien description was flawed,
but it was sufficient to give notice.

The court finds that all

of plaintiffs1 mechanic's liens were not properly verified.
35.
Robert

F.

That the reasonable value of the attorney fees by

Bentley, attorney

for

the C & A Companies, as the

prevailing party on the lien foreclosure is $6,000.00 and the
reasonable value of the attorney

fees by LaVar E. Stark, as

attorney for First Interstate Bank and Stewart Title of Salt Lake
is the sum of $6,000.00.
36.

The court finds that Frank S. Campbell, F. Richard

Campbell, Gary
Bentley

and

Dee

C & A

Jones, Robert
Companies,

A.

Inc.

Campbell
were

and

partners

Robert
of

F.

C & A

Enterprises, but were not served with process in this action.
Plaintiff, Worthington & Kimball Construction Company, a general
partnership, should have the right to commence an appropriate
action against the individual partners of C & A Enterprises, an
Arizona partnership for a determination as to their liability
under this Judgment, without any prejudice for failure to join
the individual partners at the commencement of this action.
From

the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now

concludes as a matter of law:

-17CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That

there

is

now

due

and

owing

from

the

defendants, C & A Development Company, an Arizona corporation,
C & A

Enterprises,

an

Arizona

partnership,

to Worthington

&

Kimball Construction Company, a Utah general partnership, Gary
Worthington and Edwin N. Kimball, general partners, the sum of
$377,131.00, together with interest at the rate of 10%; the court
further

finds

that

of

this

amount,

$2,355.00

was

personal

property and was not properly lienable, leaving a balance due and
owing,

subject

to

the

Utah

Mechanic's

Lien

Statute

of

$374,776.00, which includes the amounts the amounts due and owing
to Otto Buehner & Company, dba Buehner Concrete as provided for
in these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, exclusive of
attorney fees.

The mechanic's lien filed in Weber County by Gary

J. Worthington and Edwin N. Kimball, dba Worthington and Kimball
to secure the above amounts recorded on January 14, 1982, as
Entry

No. 850356

in Book

1396

at page

258 of

the

official

records, is null and void and was not properly perfected because
of the defective verification of the lien pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, §38-1-7 as amended.
2.
Buehner

&

That
Company

there
by

is now

due

plaintiff,

and

owing

Worthington

to
&

the

Otto

Kimball

Construction Company the sum of $41,466.00 together with interest
since December 1, 1981, in the sum of $13,820.00, or a total of

-18$55,286.00, together with reasonable attorneyfs fees in the sum
of $12,000.00 for enforcement of its lien, which is secured by a
good and sufficient Mechanic's Lien as provided for in Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, §38-1-7, on the following described property:
Lot 9, Plat "A" of the Weber County Industrial
Park
That the mechanic's lien of Otto Buehner & Company is prior in
time and prior in priority to the interest of any of the other
defendants, C & A Development Company, an Arizona corporation,
C & A Enterprises, an Arizona partnership, First Interstate Bank
of Arizona, N.A. , Stewart

Title

Company

of

Salt Lake City,

Permaloy Corporation, Holbrook Company, Inc., Donald K. Lybbert
dba Lybbert Masonry Company, Joseph Smith Plumbing, Redd Roofing
Company,

Worthington

&

Kimball

Construction

Company,

Gary

Worthington and Edwin N. Kimball, and that the above described
property be foreclosed and sold by the Sheriff of Weber County,
as in such cases made and provided and that the proceeds from the
sale thereof after payment of the costs be applied first to the
satisfaction of the amounts due and owing to Otto Buehner &
Company as herein, and the balance, if any, to C & A Development
Company, an Arizona corporation, C & A Enterprises, an Arizona
partnership, and C & A Companies, an Arizona corporation, First
Interstate Bank of Arizona, N.A., as their interest may appear or
as the above entitled court may determine.

In the event that the

proceeds of the sale are insufficient to satisfy the amounts due

-19and owing

to defendant, Otto Buehner

Buehner

Company

&

shall

have

a

& Company herein, Otto

deficiency

Worthington & Kimball Construction Company.

judgment

against

The amounts due and

owing to Otto Buehner & Company, exclusive of attorney fees are
also included in the amounts due and owing in paragraph 1 of the
Conclusions

of

Law,

owing

by

C & A

Development

Company,

an

Arizona corporation, C & A Enterprises, an Arizona partnership,
and C & A Companies, an Arizona corporation, to Worthington &
Kimball Construction Company.
4.

That

corporation,

C & A

entitled

a

to

C & A

Development

Enterprises,

reduction

from

an

the

Company,

Arizona
amounts

an

Arizona

partnership,
due

and

are

owing

to

Worthington & Kimball Construction Company for $6,000.00 as the
reasonable attorney's fees for prevailing in the mechanic's lien
foreclosure

action

and

the

failure

of Worthington

& Kimball

Construction Company to establish their mechanic's lien.
5.

That First Interstate Bank of Arizona, N.A. is

entitled to a judgment against Worthington & Kimball Construction
Company

for

prevailing
failure

$6,000.00

as

the

in the mechanic's

of

Worthington

&

reasonable

attorney's

lien foreclosure
Kimball

fee

for

action and the

Construction

Company

to

establish their mechanic's lien.
6.

That

there

is now

due

and

owing

to

the

Otto

Buehner & Company by Worthington & Kimball Construction Company,

-20the sum of $3,749.94 as the difference between the interest rate
agreed between the parties and the legal rate awarded by the
court.
7.

That Joseph Smith dba Joseph Smith Plumbing is

entitled to a judgment against Worthington & Kimball Construction
Company, a Utah general partnership, Gary Worthington and Edwin
N. Kimball, general partners, for the sum of $8,145.04, together
with interest as provided for by law.
8.

Any person acquiring any interest since filing the

lien as herein specified shall be foreclosed of any right, title
or interest as subscribed herein.
9.
C & A

That

Development

the rights
Company,

and
an

claims of

Arizona

the defendants,

corporation,

C & A

Enterprises, an Arizona partnership, First Interstate Bank of
Arizona, N.A., Stewart Title Company of Salt Lake City, Permaloy
Corporation,

Hoibrook

Lybbert Masonry

Company,

Company, Joseph

Inc..
Smith

Donald

K.

Lybbert

Plumbing, Redd

dba

Roofing

Company, and Worthington & Kimball Construction Company and any
other person or persons claiming by or through or under them be
declared to be subject and subordinate to the mechanic's lien of
the defendant, Otto Buehner & Company and such rights or claims
of such defendants and such other persons be forever barred,
subject only to redemption in the manner provided by law.

-2110.

That

the

plaintiff,

Worthington

&

Kimball

Construction Company, a general partnership, shall have the right
to commence an appropriate action against the individual partners
of C & A Enterprises, an Arizona partnership for a determination
as to their liability under this Judgment, without any prejudice
for failure to join the individual partners at the commencement
of this action.
Dated this

day of

, 1985.

BY THE COURT:

JUDGE
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the following parties
by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Robert F. Bentley
Attorney for C & A Development Co. and
C & A Enterprises, Inc.
7525 East Camelback Road
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251
LaVar E. Stark
Attorney for First Interstate Bank of
Arizona, N.A. and
Security Title Company of Salt Lake
2651 Washington Boulevard
Suite 10
Ogden, Utah 84401

-22Robert F. Babcock
Attorney for Plaintiff
185 South State, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
postage prepaid, this ft/
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day o

THOMAS A. DUFFIN of
SPAFFORD, DIBB, DUFFIN & JENSEN
Attorneys for Defendant,
Otto Buehner & Company
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 531-8020
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
Utah general partnership
GARY WORTHINGTON and
EDWIN N. KIMBALL, general
partners,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER, JUDGMENT AND
DECREE OF FORECLOSURE

)
)

C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
an Arizona corporation,
C & A ENTERPRISES, an Arizona
partnership, FIRST INTERSTATE
BANK OF ARIZONA, N.A.,
STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF
SALT LAKE CITY, C & A
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., an
Arizona corporation,
PERMALOY CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, OTTO BUEHNER &
COMPANY, HOLBROOK COMPANY,
INC., DONALD K. LYBBERT, dba
LYBBERT MASONRY COMPANY,
JOSEPH SMITH PLUMBING,
REDD ROOFING COMPANY and
JOHN DOES 1 through 24,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. 83387

-2The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial
before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, one of the judges of the
above entitled court, on December 3 , 4 , 5

and 6, 1984.

Robert F.

Babcock appearing for and on behalf of plaintiffs, Worthington
and Kimball Construction Company, a Utah general partnership,
Gary Worthington and Edwin N. Kimball, general partners; Robert
F. Bentley and Vaughn Armstrong appearing for and on behalf of
C & A

Development

Company,

an

Arizona

corporation,

C & A

Enterprises, an Arizona general partnership, comprised of Frank
S. Campbell, F. Richard Campbell, Robert A. Campbell, Gary Dee
Jones, Robert F. Bentley, and C & A Companies, Inc., an Arizona
corporation; LaVar E. Stark appearing for and on behalf of First
Interstate Bank of Arizona, N.A., and Stewart Title Company of
Salt Lake City; Thomas A. Duffin appearing for and on behalf of
Otto Buehner & Company and Joseph Smith Plumbing.

Whereupon the

court heard the respective testimony of plaintiff and defendants
in support of their Complaint and Counterclaims and Cross-claims
for a period of four days and then having taken the matter under
advisement, and being fully advised in the premises, and having
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT

IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED:
1.

That Worthington & Kimball Construction Company, a

Utah general partnership, have and recover from C & A Development

-3Company, an Arizona corporation, C & A Enterprises, an Arizona
partnership, the sum of $377,131.00 together with interest at the
rate of 101 and the court further finds that of this amount,
$2,355.00 was personal property and was not properly lienable,
leaving a balance due and owing, subject to the Utah Mechanic's
Lien Statute of $374,776.00.

That the amounts as provided herein

also include the amounts due and owing to Otto Buehner & Company
as hereinafter set forth, exclusive of attorney fees as provided
in paragraph 3 of this Decree.
2.

The mechanic's lien filed in Weber County by Gary

J. Worthington and Edwin N. Kimball, dba Worthington and Kimball
Construction Company, to secure the above amounts recorded on
January 14, 1982, as Entry No. 850356 in Book 1396 at page 258 of
the official records, as more particularly described in Weber
County, State of Utah, as:
Lot 9, Plat "A" of the Weber County Industrial
Park
is null and void and was not properly perfected because of the
defective

verification

of

the

lien

pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Annotated, 1953, §38-1-7 as amended.
3.

A notice of lien was filed in Weber County by Gary

J. Worthington and Edwin N. Kimball, dba Worthington and Kimball
Construction Co. secured by the above amounts, recorded February
8, 1982, as Entry No. 851656 in Book 1397 at page 768 of official
records, as more particularly described in Weber County, State of

-4Utah, as:
Lot 9, Plat "A" of the Weber County Industrial
Park
is null and void and was not properly

perfected because the

defective verification of the mechanic's lien pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, §38-1-7 as amended.
3.

That the amount due and owing to Otto Buehner &

Company by Worthington & Kimball Construction Company, is the sum
of $41,466.00 "together with interest since December 1, 1981, in
the sum of $13,820,00, or a total of $55,286.00, together with
reasonable attorney's fees in the sum of $12,000.00 or a total of
$67,286.00 for enforcement of its lien, which is secured by a
good and sufficient Mechanic's Lien as provided for in Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, §38-1-7, on the following described property:
Lot 9, Plat "A" of the Weber County Industrial
Park
That the mechanic's lien of Otto Buehner & Company is prior in
time and prior in priority to the interest of any of the other
defendants, C & A Development Company, an Arizona corporation,
C & A Enterprises, an Arizona partnership, First Interstate Bank
of

Arizona, N.A. , Stewart

Title

Company

of

Salt

Lake

City,

Permaloy Corporation, Holbrook Company, Inc., Donald K. Lybbert
dba Lybbert: Masonry Company, Joseph Smith Plumbing, Redd Roofing
Company,

Worthington

&

Kimball

Construction

Company,

Gary

Worthington and Edwin N. Kimball, and that the above described

-5property be foreclosed and sold by the Sheriff of Weber County,
as in such cases made and provided and that the proceeds from the
sale thereof after payment of the costs be applied first to the
satisfaction of the amounts due and owing

to Otto Buehner &

Company as herein, and the balance, if any, to C & A Development
Company, an Arizona corporation, C & A Enterprises, an Arizona
partnership, and as to any other parties as their interest may
appear or as the above entitled court may determine.

In the

event that the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to satisfy
the amounts due and owing to defendant, Otto Buehner & Company
herein, Otto Buehner & Company shall have a deficiency judgment
against

Worthington

&

Kimball

Construction

Company,

Gary

Worthington and Edwin N. Kimball, general partners,
4.

That

corporation,

C & A

C & A

Development

Enterprises,

an

Company,

Arizona

an

Arizona

partnership,

are

entitled to a reduction against the amounts owing to Worthington
& Kimball Construction Company for $6,000.00 as the reasonable
attorney's fees for prevailing in the mechanic's lien foreclosure
action and

the failure of Worthington

& Kimball

Company to establish their mechanic's lien.

Construction

The same is offset

against the amounts due and owing as set forth in paragraph 1 of
the

general

Construction

judgment
Company

entered
against

by

Worthington

&

Kimball

C & A

Development,

an

Arizona

corporation, C & A Enterprises, an Arizona partnership.

-65.

That First Interstate Bank of Arizona, N.A. have

and recover against Worthington & Kimball Construction Company a
judgment

for

prevailing
failure

$6,000.00

as

the reasonable

in the mechanic's

of

Worthington

&

attorney's

lien foreclosure
Kimball

fee

for

action and the

Construction

Company

to

establish their mechanic's lien.
6.

That Otto Buehner & Company have and recover a

judgment against Worthington & Kimball Construction Company for
the sum of $3,749.94 together with interest at the rate of 15%
per annum from date hereof, as an additional sum not set forth in
the foreclosure of its Mechanic's Lien.
7.

That Joseph Smith dba Joseph Smith Plumbing have

and recover judgment against Worthington & Kimball Construction
Company, a Utah general partnership, Gary Worthington and Edwin
N. Kimball, general partners, for the sum of $8,145.04, together
with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from date hereof.
8.

Any person acquiring any interest since filing the

lien as herein specified shall be foreclosed of any right, title
or interest as subscribed herein.
9.
C & A

That

Development

the rights
Company,

and
an

claims

Arizona

of

the defendants,

corporation,

C & A

Enterprises, an Arizona partnership, First Interstate Bank of
Arizona, N.A., Stewart Title Company of Salt Lake City, Permaloy
Corporation,

Holbrook

Company,

Inc.,

Donald

K.

Lybbert

dba

-7Lybbert Masonry

Company, Joseph

Smith Plumbing, Redd Roofing

Company, and Worthington & Kimball Construction Company and any
other person or persons claiming by or through or under them be
declared to be subject to and subordinate to the mechanic's lien
of

the defendant, Otto Buehner & Company and such rights or

claims of

such defendants

and

such other persons be forever

barred, subject only to redemption in the manner provided by law.
10.

That

the

plaintiff,

Worthington

&

Kimball

Construction Company, a general partnership, have the right to
commence an appropriate action against the individual partners of
C & A Enterprises, an Arizona partnership for a determination as
to their liability under this Judgment, without any prejudice for
failure to join the individual partners at the commencement of
this action.
Dated this

/5"

day of ^ j / W

, 1985.

BY THE COURT:

_j/
JUDGE

-8MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify tliat 1 mailed a copy of the foregoing
Judgment to the following parties by placing a true copy thereof
in an envelope addressed to:
Fobert F. Bentley
Attorney for C & A Development Co, and
C & A Enterprises, Inc.
7525 East Camelback Road
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251
LaVar E. Stark
Attorney for First Interstate Bank of
Arizona, N.A. and
Security Title Company of Salt Lake
2651 Washington Boulevard
Suite 10
Ogden, Utah 84401
Robert F. Babcock
Attorney for Plaintiff
185 South State, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

postage prepaid, t h i s

Jl

day o f ^ X M > u / 1 9 8 5 .
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1

III THE SECOIJD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR '7EBER COUNTY

2
3
4
5

iJORTHINGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a U t a h g e n e r a l p a r t n e r s h i p ,
GARY WORTIIINGTON a n d EDWIN N . KIMBALL,
g e n e r a l p a r -criers,

6

Plaintiffs,

7

Cass No. 833G7

vs.

8
9

C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, an
Arizona corporation, C & A ENTERPRISES,
etal,

PROCEEDINGS

10

Defendants.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22

BE IT REIIEI13ERED, that this cause cans on fcr
trial ;;n Decbnbsr 3, 4, 5 and 6, 1934, before the HON.
RONALD 0, HYDE, Judge presiding, at t.ie Municipal Building
in Oad.=n, Utah.
APPEARANCES;
ROBERT F. BABCOCIC, ESQ., appeared fcr plaintiff$.
ROBERT F. BENTLEY, ESQ., appeared for C & A
Development and C & A Enterprises? defendant^.
LaVAR E. STARK, ESQ., appeared for First
Interstate Bank of Arizona, defendant.
THOI1A5 A« DUFFIN, ESQ., appeared for Otto
Buohner & Company9 defendant.

23
24
25

E V E L Y N STORRS, C.S.R.
437 M U N I C I P A L

BLDG.

OH DIRECT EXAMINATION 3Y MR. BABCOCK OT MR. KIMBALL:
2
Q.

3
4

project, a Mecanic's Lien?

5
6
7

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

L.

Yes, I did.

0.

Let ne direct your attention to Exhibit—

first of £.11, 217.
1.

8
9

Did you have occasion to file a lien en this

Yes.

r?

ell,

Do you recognize that document?

This is a lien of a concrete contractor who

felt tnat he wasn't gating paid wnat was entitled hin for hi:
work.

Ue later, whan he was calmed down, were able to sit

down and show him that he had been paid every nickel cw=d hinJ
and he removed this lien.

In the meantime I had to insure

around this one by putting $10,396,00 on deposit with the
title company that was insuring the title for C & A.
Q.

All right.

And this lien, this notice of lien, was|

in your file?
A.

Yes, I had copies of this lien.

Q.

All right.

Exhibit 218.

Let r.e direct your attention to

Do you recognize that exhibit?

L

Okay.

0.

All right.

/<,

This is a rough draft that was put together by

I have that in front of ne.
Do you know './hat that document is?

Gary Wcrtningtcn with scne inputs from me.

It was determined

that Wo would utilize as a pattern this lien of Mr. I'uni' s ,
since we weren't lien experts and that was filed by a lawyer,

EVELYN STORRS, C.S.R.

1 and t h a t u t i l i z i n g t h a t p a t t e r n v:= would p u t t c - r a t h e r a
2 c r th= b u i l d i n g .

And Mr. ' / c r t n i n a t c n had i t

3 u r u c d i t c v = r t e :•'.= t c
4

0-

Ohsy.

t y p e d up and

fil=.

I n e t s a t t h e t c p c f t h e s s c e n e ne^_

it

5 llechs l i k s y e u r h a n d w r i t i n g ' s t h e r e and i t c h a n c e d t h s
6 Can yeu t e l l
7

A.

T

us s b c u t

lisn

dates.

tnat?

. r s l l , I had i n ny p e s s e s s i e n a t t h s t i r e a c c p y ef

8 t a s d c c u r i e n t t n a t I p i c k e d up f r c n r e n t i n g t h s b a c h h c e ,
9 utilizing

t n a t dccura=nt I c e u l d e s t a b l i s h t h a t I was en

10 j e b en e n s 1 2 t u e f S = p t e r ± - e r — I ' n s c r r y — t h s 1 2 t h ^
..

11

JC...

and
ths

'UcvirLir,

Ilr. Williams gave it

12
13

Ju

I :.icdified it and retyped it, yes,

14

J.

I7nat did y:u do witn it after yen had it tyoed°
I guess I direct your attention tc Exhibit 219.

15

16 Is that "in-a. document that was finalized?
17

A.

Exhibit 219 is a ccpy cf the document that was

18 finalized, yes.
19

2.

Afwcr you typed it, what did ycu do with it?

20 J

?:.

After I typed tha lian# I want cv-r—wall, I naedad

21 it notarized, and I thought that probably they'd have a
22 (notary up here since they run so rauch work through tha
23 recorder•

And I went over and notified Nick over at Buahnar

24 [Concrete tnat wa had a prcblen and were getting ncwhera, and
25 chat I was filing a lien.

And I snowed hin this lien that I

E V E L Y N STORRS, C.S.R.
437 MUNICIPAL BLOG.

1 was filing, and informed .*:r.—Gas, I have forgotten his last
2 'nana.

3

Dut I infcrnad Hick that he ought tc be filing ens else

s will as I notified all of v.\y subs that we still hadn't

4 b==ri paid rcniss for.

And v;han I nanticned tc hin that I

5 was headed next tc gat it notarized and filed, Hick tcld n=,
6 ne said, "r/a've get a notary right here."

And I had forgotten

7 wner= I had filed the thing—or where I had nad it netc.rized,
8 and so on, until I got to looking into it again.

And 'Ir.

9 Allrsd is a notary in the office of Buehner Concrete.
10

Mow I went out to one car and brought ny briefcase back

11 in waile Hick was getting ahold of Mr. Allred, and I brought
12 out this decunent showing hin when I had rented the back \\z^
13 and dons that last work, and that since this was the first
14 lien I'd ever filed, and net knowing what notaries did with
15 liens, I was appalled whan I heard hin say, '"/Jail, I've T:~
16 no interest in that docunant."

Ha said, ":iy only purpose is

17 to swaar ycu in and have you subscribe to the fact that you
18 know the contents of this lien, and that you know that those
19 contents are true, and that ycu can testify to that."

And

20 with tnat explanation I put ny papers back in my briefcase.
21

0.

Did you sign the lien?

22

A.

Yes, I did.

23

Q.

Did you tell hin that the things were true?

24

ft.

Yes, I did.

25

0.

Did he notarize it?

EVELYN STORRS. C.S.R.

1
2
3

A.

Y e s , ha d i d .

Q.

v7hat d i d y c u d c a f t e r that?

A.

17=11, I b s w i l d e r u l y drcva u p h e r s end filad i t .

4
S

REPORTER'S

6
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This is -co c e r t i f y -chat I , E v e l y n S , F u n k , wa.s c n = of

7

the o f f i c i a l c o u r t r e p o r t e r s o f tha S e c o n d .Judicial District

8

C o u r t o f U t a h ; t h a t I v/as p r e s e n t in c o u r t d u r i n g t h e t r i a l

9

in the a b o v e m a t t e r , and t h e r e a t r e p o r t e d in s t e n o g r a p h tha

10

proceedings had.

11

T h e f o r e g o i n g p a g a s of t r a n s c r i p t , 2 to 5 , i n c l u s i v e f

12

constitute a true and correct transcription of my said

13
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14
15 !|
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1935.

16
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18
19
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20
21
22
23
24
25
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1

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR NEBER COUNTY

2
3
4
5

.•70RTHINGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a U - a n cr=.n=ral p a r t n e r s h i p ,
GARY WORTIIINGTON~and EDr.7IN N, KIMBALL,
general par'cnirs,

6

Plaintiffs,

7

Case No. 83387

vs.
8
9

C & A DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, an
Arizona corporation, C & A Enterprises
an
an Arizona partnership, etai,

10

Partial Transcript
^•P

n

roceedir/rs

Defendants.

11
12

BE IT REMEMBERED, that this cause care on for

13
•crial •

14

:n Decenber 4 , 5 , and 6, 1934, before the "ION. RONALD

0. HYD Z, Judge presiding, at 'die Municipal Building in Ogden,

15
U-5.il.

16
17
18
19
20
21

APPEARANCES ;
ROBERT F. BABCOCK, ESQ., appeared

c

or

Plaintiffs.
ROBERT F. BENTLEY,ESQ., appeared "or C £. A
Developneno c.nd C & A Enterprises.
LaVAR E. STARK, ESQ., appeared for First
Interstate Bank cf Arizona.

22

THOMAS A. DUFFIN, ESQ., appeared on behalf
23

of Otto Buehner & Company.
24
25

ru C T O R R < ;

r.S.R.

(OM CROSS EXAI1INATION, DECEMBER 5, 1984, BY :TR. STARK OF
ED/7IIJ KIIIBALL)
BY :iR. STARK:
Q.

Ycur deposition was taken, at least the 14th and

2 0th day of August of '84, and possibly a day earlier, or a
f=w days earlier --nan that; is that your recollection?
A.

5onetime back through that period.

I would have

00 check my calendar,
Q.

Referring 00 Pag= 29-- Is his deposition handy so

.iB can look at it?
L.

Bob, I believe it's in ny briefcase back there.
(nanaed to witness)

Q.

Page 29.

Let ns ask you if indeed I asked you the

questions as indicated and the responses as indicated?
were your responses referring to the Mechanic's Lien that
you prepared, going to Line 13:
"0.

Let r.e show you what appears to be a copy of

notice of li^n dated January 13, 1932, apparently signed by
you, and ask ycu if you recognize it, please?

Does that

appear to be ycur signature?
II n

Yes, it does.
Die ycu cause the document tc be prepared?

"A.

Excuse rae?

"Q.

Did ycu cause what document tc be prepared?

It ?

Oh, I chink a lack of payment caused it tc be

1

prepared.

2

"0.

Did ycu require scrvacne to type that notice of lien

"A.

I typed up.

3

up?

4

I dcn't do toe well with one fingsr

5 J missing, but I typed it.
e Jj

"&

And ycu typed it uo on cr about the 13th of

January of '32, the date it shews that it was signed?

7

"A.

8

No, we had several rough drafts prior to that, and

it nay have been typed a day or so before.

9

"0.

10

//hen ycu say we raay have had several drafts, to

when do ycu refer?

11

"A.

12

Oh, I reviewed the problem with Itr. T7orthington and

determined that the tine was of the essence and we .iad to

13
14
15

"£>.

3c the two of you together talked about making—?

16

"A.

It seeras like two weeks before cr three weeks befcr-

17

we nade a rcugh draft of it.

18

"Q.

The two of you together did?

19 ||

"A.

Oh, I dcn't recall if it was just ns alone cr the

20 ii "iwo °f

us

together,

2X II

"&

Ycu talked with Mr. Worthingtcn?

22

"A.

V7e talked it over, yes.

23

"Q.

And where were ycu v/hen ycu signed this document?

24

"A.

I was in the presence of a notary public.

25

" Q.

Who?

EVELYN STORRS, C.S.R.

1\\

»a.

Since I don't use anyone in particular, I nay have

2 || gone to a used car agency or gone to one of the ether people
3 I knew uha-c had a notary stamp, X- lcoks like Mr. Arnold
Allan* I do ncc have a personal working acquaintance with
4
him, so I ei'cher dropped by the bank or a car dealer, or
5
someone that I knew could notarize the document for me.
6
"0Dc you recall where ycu v/ere when you signed the
7
8

document?

9

"A.

10

I'd have

^ check en that:.

11 I
12

Tha-c one may have been done in the bank,

"&

Is ir your testimony then that you signed this in

tne presence of Arnold Allen?

13

"A.

That's correct.

14

"Q,

On the 13th of January, 1982?

15

n

L

I believe that's whan it's dated, yes.

16

"2.

And that was as you recall in a bank?

,W

17

A.

17ell, like I say, I don't knew.

It may have been inj

18

^cive bank.

19

inclined to go to one or two cf the branches that were in

20

itiy area cut there*
f,

21

'Q.

It was more than— A-c that cime I was more

What: bank do you refer oc?

22

"A# " >T^3 one thao I do most of my notarizing was First

23

Security Bank.

24

Trust or Draper Bank.

25

"&

However, this could have been Tracy Bank &

Do you know Arnold Allen?

EVELYN STORRS, C.S.R.

1

"A.

I have no working acquaintance with hin.

The only

2

thing I renenber about tha signing cf it is that he wanted

3

to sea ny driver's license, and see the picture en it, and

4

ccnpara ir with ne tc naka sure I was zhe one siqning the

5

J decunenc.

6

II

7

II There's sone writing beneath your signature.

8

ii i n ?

g

II

"Q

Okay.

Lock ar that again if ycu would, please.
:7hc typed tha*:

"A.

Beneath ny signature?

10

"Q

Yes.

11

"J*.

I icypad tiia": in.

"Q.

New where were ycu whan ycu typed up tha notice cf

12

||

13

II lien?

14

||

In ny residence.

M

Urah County?

"ft.

Sandy,

"0.

Ycu dcnft recall what bank ycu went tc, huh?

"A..

No, I don't. All I knew, it would probably be one

Q

15
16
17

"Ji.

||

18
19

13-eh.

in icha Sandy area*

20

"0

Near where your office is?

21

"A.

Near where ny hone is.

22 ||

"0<

Did the notary ask you whether or net the natters

23 ll s'ca-ced in the notice of the lien were true?
24 ||

"A.

The notary inforned ne that his seal was for tha

25 II sole purpose cf identifying ne and ny oath, and that I had

E V E L Y N STORRS, C.S.R.

1

w£.k=n i t and s i g n e d p r o p e r l y , p r o p a r l y s i g n e d t h e

2

document.

3

t h e r e o n l y s t i p u l a t e d c h a t and n o t h i n g r . o r e .

He s a i d thaw he h i n s e l f by n u t t i n g h i s s e a l en

4

"Q.

S ^ p u l a t e d what?

5

"A.

Tha-c I appeared b e f o r e h i n , and under o a t h I had

6

s i g n e d t h e d o c u n e n t , and th&z i t was t r u e and c o r r e c t , and

7

•zhcz I had p e r s o n a l knowledge of i t s

contents."

8

Q.

Uere t h o s e t h e q u e s t i o n s and ansi/ers a*c t h a t tiir.e?

9

i\.

Yes, uhay were.
: «7>

10

pnrnv,

all

v-Vir-

11
(ON REDIRECT SEMINATION, DECEIIBER 5, 1934, BY MR. -

12
13 |

BABCOCK OF EDV7III KIMBALL)
Q.

14

Can ycu explain hew your recollection was

15

refreshed about the events following the notarization of

16

the Mechanic's Lien that was filed by ycu in this case?
A.

17

Yes.

Mr.. Soark questioned me expensively en v/hsr=

18

I had found a notary.

I -cold hin what r.y connon practices

19

were.

20

it, so that I would knew for sura what the answers should

21

nave been, I gave— Tna-c's why the answers were so vague is

22

I did not have to-cal recollection,

23

this gentleman's name in -cue phone beck,

Ana wanting -co know for ny3elf where I had signed

I went and locked up

24

Q.

25

I direct your attention to the exhibit.

il

a

Th== lien had an address under his signature?

F V P L Y N STORRS, C.S.R.

1

A.

I don't recall chat.

2

in 'ch= phone book*

3

answered,

4

I asked:

I do know it was locked up

A call was made to his home.

His wife

"Is this wh=re the notary public lives, and

5| where does he work?"
6I

The response was:

"3uehnsr Concrete,"

7

And caen it cane ic light that I had been down there and

8- seen Hick who had been pressuring ma for payment, and said:
9 1 "Nick, I'm having to file a lien.
10

If you want tc join in

this, I suggest you get your lien in,"

11

MR. BABCOCX:

12

All right. Thank ycu.

(ON EECRGSS EXAIilNATIQIJ, DECEMBER 5, 1984, BY MR. STARK

13 I OF EDWIil KIMBALL)
14 J

Q,

New I believe you have testified that in the

15

conduce cf your construction business you hava nor found it

16

necessary to file any notice of liens; is that correct?

17

ft.

18

filed.

19
20 I
2i
22
23
24
25

Q.
A

0.

That is correct. Tnis is the first one I've ever

The first one ycu hava ever filed.
YfeS

-

And it was filed by you in January of 1982; is thai

right?
A.

I'd have to look a- the lien.

I assume you're

right.
0.

And you were c l a i m i n g some $500,000, $ 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 ,

E V E L Y N STORRs, C S . R .

1

something like that, whatever it says, a large anount of

2

money?

3

A.

Okay,

4J

&

Right?

51

A-

(nods head up and down)

6I

&

So this v/as indeed as far as you'rs concerned an

7

isolated event in connection with your construction business?

8i That is to say, it is the first lien you've ever filed?
i
9I
A.
That I have, yes.
10
11

Q

Yes. And when your deposition v/as taken in Auaust

of this year, didn't you remember the circumstances of

12 ! signing that lien and the filing of it?
13 I

A.

I didn't renumber the location where I had signed

14

tne lien.

I remembered the circumstances because it was

15

the first one that I had ever signed.

16

I took paper work with me to show the notary that I could

17

prove the last date, and so on.

I do remember that

And he told me that wasn't

18 I of his concern.
19

Q.

Well, were the circumstances as you testified in

20

*che deposition that I read, that was taken in August, or as

21

Y c u have now testified in court?

22

A.

I don't find any contradiction in either, because

23

normally I go just down to the bank, or local corner bank or

24

something, and grab the nearest used car salesman or

25

whoever has got a notary seal.

EVELYN STORRS, C.S.R.

ijj

0,

To file a Mechanic's Lien for $500,000?

2 ||

A.

A notary is a notary; isn't it?

3
4
5
6
7 ||

8
9
10
11
12
13
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Mr. Chairman (Rep. Sykes):

The next item on the agenda

is Simplified Mechanics Lien Notice, House Bill 56, Representative
Holt.

I just saw him walk in.
Rep. Scott W. Holt:
Chairman:

Good morning.

Rep. Scott W. Holt:
House clearing Bill.

Good morning.

Basically, all this Bill is is a

The purpose of the Mechanics Lien is to give

a party notice, a claimant or a materialman or someone who is

has

been shorted someway with regards to supplies, labor, services
performed.

I'm an attorney and... run into a practice an awful

lot that people of the trade just have difficulty filling out
Mechanics Liens properly and this is just to assist them. The
Supreme Court is also addressing the problem.

The Supreme Court

has made several rulings with regards to Mechanics Lien, Notary
type statements in the 1982 and 1983 and they've made it rather
technical so that anybody that screws up a little bit with regards
to the statement although the notice is there for everyone to
read, just because its a Mechanics Lien will lose his claim.

The

old law basically is to set forth a person had to sign one of
these things under a subscribed and sworn to but different
practitioners within the state and out of state, there is a lot of
different notary statements that float around and usually are
attached to Mechanics Lien and the Supreme Court has come down and
has construed this language in the existing statute most narrowly
and that's the purpose of this is just to simplify and get away
from technicalities I don't think have any part with our
procedures and our idea of what mechanics liens are for, and
that's all this bill addressing.
Mr. Chairman:

What, what difference, would you give us

an example of before and after, concisely how that would ah...be
different.
Rep. Scott K. Holt:

...Urn, as the law requires right

now, a person would have to sign a mechanics lien with the
statement subscribed and sworn to by a notary.
have to use the oath.

The notary would

Although that's how the law is now; this

basically would mean that a person would just have to sign it and
date it, and would not have to obtain a notary or go through a
notarization type process.
statement put on.

There wouldn't have to be a notary

And that's what an awful lot of Court cases

have swung on is the technicality:
her job correctly?

is has that notary done his or

Quite a few mechanics have basically lost

their lien because of a small technicality.

The Supreme Court has

taken the tack that its exact and very precise like I said all the
requiring the ifs and tfs be crossed in these notary type
statements in the mechanics lien and a lot of people just donft
understand.

I mean the mechanics liens sounds simple if you read

through the law, but when you actually put together the form, it!s
fairly hard for a lot of people and I'm hired and retained a lot
of times to have to draw these things up for people•

This isn't

something that you should have to go hire a lawyer for to get the
exact form.

This is something that a materialman ought to be able

to do on his own to protect his lien and this is why —

this is

the problem we're trying to address in this bill is (cough, cough)
to make it simple for everybody for have and keep lien rights.
Mr. Chairman:

Now we wouldn't want your business to

suffer because of this, Representative.
Rep. Scott W. Holt:

No, but I see an abuse and a need

and that's all I'm trying to grasp.
Rep. H. Craig Moody:

Representative Scott W. Holt, my

only question is, right now with the notary being required, is
this going to change the recording of the lien in order to make it
valid?
Rep. Scott W. Holt: No.
Rep. H. Craig Moody:
recorded.

So it still will need to be

Is the date of the 80 days going back from the date

that it is filed or is it the date that it's recorded?

Rep. Scott W. Holt:

The 80 days, the way the current

law is, and this hasn't modified the existing law with regard to
the time periods.

For a General Contractor, he has to file his

lien 100 days after his last work, labor or services were rendered
or performed.
Rep. H. Craig Moody:
recorded or just have —

When you say filed, does that mean

.

Rep. Scott W. Holt:

Recorded*

Rep. H. Craig Moody:
Rep. Scott W. Holt:
recorder's office.

Alright.
Recorded in the appropriate

I'm not modifying any of the other language,

that language existed before.
Mr. Chairman:

This does not change it.

Alright so this wouldn't create a

situation where somebody could go in and say, "Well, gee, you know
I backdated it to the 15th
Rep. Scott W. Holt:

No.

Rep. H. Craig Moody:
Rep. Scott W. Holt:

But I did file it on the 30th.
Yeah —

when —

they go by tne date

of recordation, of the date and time.
Rep. H. Craig Moody:

So the days still apply to the

recording?
Mr. Chairman:

Uh, just, just one quick question.

You

mean that you wouldn't have to have an acknowledgement to record
it either?

-4-

Rep. Scott W. Holt:

No.

Rep. Scott W. Holt:

See where a lot of people got in

trouble with was they —
Mr. Chairman:

.
So, so you could —

Rep. Scott W. Holt:

.

Put down an acknowledgement instead

of a subscribed and sworn to or they'll come in —

uh you'll get a

corporation and you'll have them basically say, like someone is
working for Boise Cascade, an agency type of situation from the
main materialman and he'll put down a different form.

A lot of

states require different types of verifications, different types
of notary type statements. —

And Utah, just says subscribed and

sworn to and where the materialman or the lien claimants have
gotten trouble in the past is the best technique for setting aside
these liens by someone who's trying to beat him out of his money_
is he'll come in and argue the technicality that he hasn't
followed the proper lien form.

And the Supreme Court, on several

appellate cases uh, I think it was _First Security Title v.
Katmans, I remember, a 1982 case.

Basically, they come through

an6 instead of saying veil the person is substantially coir.plifco,
which is the way it should be, they're saying,"Well, he didn't
have the right notary —
out his lien.

So,

or —

they've they've construed this most, most

narrowly, most technically.
—

on this thing" and they've thrown

And what I'm trying to do is re —

address that problem and say, "Wait a minute Supreme Court,

-5-

uh

this is not an area that we need to be hyper-technical on." This
is an area that people? everybody should be able to come in and
file a claim that they feel that they've been shorted with
money.

Let's get away from being lawyers, let's get away from

doing —

the purpose is just to give a notice, that's the purpose

of the act.

And we shouldn't have too complicated for people to

do this and that's all I'm trying to do is simplify it.
.Mr. Chairman:

I notice in —

uh —

on Page 1, Line 33,

you also took out the section that said he had to deduct his
credits.

So if he gives an approximate amount, the lien would

still be valid.
Rep. Scott W. Holt:

That's right.

Because its all an

issue when you enforce these liens, the trial courts are always
going hear what are credits and what are not credits.
was —

uh —

I guess there's a —

Also the^e

the guy that drew this up for us

has also done some housekeeping that I didn't request but uh —

it

also been taken out uh —

alleging what the terms of the agreement

was in a mechanics lien.

Again, I think that's a question for

fact that will always come up at any trial.

I don't —

the

purpose is to give a notice and the more you put in there, that
the person has to give for notice, the more chance he's going to
make an error in it, the more chance that this thing is too
technical for him and you're going to have to, you know, employ an
attorney to

-6-

do something more complicated.

There is a greater charrCff that

he'll lose everything that we require.
Mr. Chairman:

Okay Representative Dixon M. Pitcher and

Representative Hunter.
Rep. Dixon M. Pitcher:
understand this correctly.

Representative, let me see if I

Actually we haven't really changed the

due process of serving, is that correct?
Rep. Scott W. Holt:

Right.

Rep. Dixon M. Pitcher:
the same force —

of —

And so really we're giving it

it was before as opposed to Court, but

actually we've simplifed the whole procedure.
you've set it where —

As far as the way

.

Rep. Scott W. Holt:

That's true.

That's the intent

here.
Rep. Dixon M. Pitcher:

It seems to me this would be a

great advantage, like you indicated for someone who didn't want to
come in and retain an attorney and move away from the concept of
how much justice [inaudible] this legislation.
Mr. Chairman:
Rep. Hunter:

Thank you, Representative ?
Being an individual who believes

in simplicity, I'd like to move this bill out favorably.
Rep. Dixon M. Pitcher:
Mr. Chairman:

I second it.

Before we take a vote on that, as we

indicated last time we will talk to the public.

•7-

Is there an-yone

here that would like to make a statement on this bill?

State your

name and position.
Holland, Neal:
Contractors Assn:

Mr. Holland Neal, of the Electrical

And we very much appreciate your representative

that came here and we urge you to support this bill.
Mr. Chairman:
motion?

Okay.

Any other discussion to the

Seeing none, I'll place the vote to the committee.

in favor Of passing this bill out favorably, say Aye.
'opposed?

It's unanimous.

-8-
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THIRD READING DISCUSSION OF H. B. No. 56

House bill No. 56 - Simplified Mechanic's Lien & Notice Scott w.
Holt; Being inacted by the Legislature by the State of Utah,
Representative Holt:

Thank you Mr. Speaker.

Before I

address this Bill f I would like to ask the Chair for a personal
privilege.

We have in the gallery, students from the Joseph Kirk

Elementary School.

The teachers are Lucille Garrit, Audrey

Frances and Janene Manning, fourth and third grade, and I would
like to ask the House to recognize them at this time, have them
stand perhaps.
Mr. Speaker;

Please stand and be recognized.

Representative Holt:

Thank you Mr. Speaker.

With regard

to the House Bill No. 56, the intent of this Bill is basically to
simplify our existing Mechanic's Liens law.

The Supreme Court

came down in two decisions; one in 1981 and another again in
1983, which chose to construe our language most narrowly.

The

proposed legislation would make it much simpler for the people to
file Mechanic's Lien and not have to worry about the
hypertechnicalities that the Supreme Court has placed upon the
lien law.

Most of the act has not been changed, all we're trying

to do is do away with the requirement of a verification and that
they put down exact terms and details with regard to the contract
date a materialman may have entered and it has no fiscal impact,
it basically is just to simplify the procedures so that anyone
can file a Mechanic's Lien and not need to have to obtain the
services of an attorney or something like that.

It's just to

make it a little simpler and a little easier for people who may
be affected and want to file a lien.
Mr. Speaker:

Others to the bill.

Seeing none, I'll turn it

back to Representative Holt for summation.
Representative Holt:
Mr. Speaker:

Ifd waive it Mr. Chairman.

The voting is now open on House Bill 56.

Seeing that all have voted.

Voting is closed, voting

is closed on House Bill 56, having received 57 affirmative votes
and no negative votes, passes this House and will be transmitted
to the Senate for its action.
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